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Evidence
Battling Domestic Violence Through the Admission of Character
Evidence
Andrew J. Glendon
I. INTRODUCTION
Domestic violence' is one of the most pressing problems of modem times,2 and
the problem is compounded by the difficulties faced in prosecuting offenders.3 With
the heightened publicity of the O.J. Simpson trial and allegations of spousal abuse,
domestic violence has reached the limelight of the issues plaguing society.
The California Supreme Court recently decided that juries can consider expert
testimony on "Battered Women's Syndrome" 4 to determine if a defendant was acting
in self-defense when she killed the domestic abuser.5 The problem of determining the
1. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 6211 (West 1994) (defining "domestic violence" as abuse against any of the
following people: (1) A spouse or former spouse, (2) a cohabitant or former cohabitant, (3) a person with whom
the respondent is having or has had a dating or engagement relationship, (4) a person with whom the respondent
has had a child, (5) a child of a party, and (6) any other person related by consanguinity or affinity to the second
degree); see also id. § 6209 (West 1994) (providing that a "cohabitant" is a person who regularly resides in the
household); id. (defining "former cohabitant" as a person who formerly regularly resided in the household).
2. See Battered-Woman Defense Gains, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 3, 1996, at B6 [hereinafter Battered-Woman]
(noting that in 1995, California law enforcement authorities logged more than 60,000 arrests for spousal abuse and
that in 1995, 179 murders were attributed to domestic violence).
3. David Kline, Assembly Approves Bill to Allow Admission of Past Domestic Violence Evidence, CAPITOL
NEWS SERVICE, July 9, 1996, at 9; see id. (finding that legislation is needed to achieve more domestic violence
prosecution because "very often the victims are too intimidated, frightened, or dependent upon the person who is
committing this domestic violence to testify against him or her in court"); see also Duke Helfand, Eyes on
Evidence; LAPD Equips Patrol Cars with New Cameras to Document Domestic Abuse Victims' Injuries and Win
Cases in Court, L.A. TIMEs, June 6, 1996, at BI (noting that about one-fifth of the 20,000 domestic abuse cases
filed by the District Attorney's office each year are dismissed because of uncooperative victims); id. (stating that
as many as eight of 10 battered women who contact police fail to press charges or pursue their case in court);
William L. Seymour, Domestic Violence Evolves from Being Family Matter to Criminal One, FRESNO BEE, Jan.
14, 1996, at BI (reasoning that domestic violence cases are not easy to prosecute because victims sometimes blame
themselves for their injuries, and also noting that "investigating and pursuing a domestic violence case is
emotionally draining" for a prosecutor); Deborah Yaffe. Justice Is Elusive for Imperfect People in an Imperfect
System, RECORDER, June 3, 1996, at I (finding that of 140 domestic violence arrests made in 11 communities on
a randomly chosen date, 71 Oust over half) were dismissed in court or went unprosecuted).
4. See Battered-Woman, supra note 2, at B6 (providing an expert's description of "Battered Women's
Syndrome," a pattern of violence experienced by repeatedly abused women which can destroy their self-esteem,
leaving them feeling powerless and sometimes leading them to respond with violence).
5. People v. Humphrey, 13 Cal. 4th 1073, 1089-90, 921 P.2d 1, 11, 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d 142, 152-53 (1996);
see id. (holding that the evidence presented by defendant was relevant to show a case of perfect self-defense
because it demonstrated the reasonableness, as well as the subjective existence, of defendant's belief in the need
to defend); see also CAL EVID. CODE § 1107(a), (b) (West 1995) (admitting evidence regarding "Battered Women's
Syndrome" and the effects upon victims of domestic violence if the proper foundation of relevancy and the proper
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scope of proof allowed by evidence of "Battered Women's Syndrome" is but one of
the many issues surrounding the domestic violence problem
Recently the Los Angeles Police Department equipped 400 patrol cars with "top-
of-the-line" cameras so that officers may document domestic violence attacks
immediately for use by prosecutors to pursue charges "even when victims refuse to
testify in court."7 The City of Oakland has a new policy to battle domestic violence
wherein police officers are expected to arrest "batterers" immediately if they witness
an assault or see evidence of injury.8 These are just some of the ideas that counties
and cities have pursued in their fight against domestic violence, and convicting repeat
domestic violence offenders has recently been made easier by action taken by the
California Legislature.
II. CHARACTER EVIDENCE AS A TOOL TO BATrLE DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
Existing law provides that "evidence of a person's character or a trait of his or
her character is inadmissible when offered to prove his or her conduct on a specified
occasion.'" However, many exceptions limit the scope of this general rule,"
qualifications of expert witnesses can be shown); Battered-Woman, supra note 2, at B6 (stating that jurics can
consider expert testimony in deciding whether a "reasonable person" in the defendant's position would have felt
life-threatening danger, which is the legal standard for acquittal on grounds of self-defense, when acting to kill a
domestic abuser).
6. See supra note 3 and accompanying text (describing the difficulties associated with prosecuting domestic
violence offenders); see also infra notes 7-8 and accompanying text (detailing some new techniques used to battle
domestic violence).
7. Helfand, supra note 3. at B I; see id. (noting that police and advocates for battered women expect that
photographing recent domestic violence attacks will dramatically assist the fight against domestic violence in Los
Angeles).
8. See Yaffe, supra note 3, at I.
9. This evidence will be collectively referred to as character evidence in this Legislative Note.
10. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1101(a) (amended by Chapter 261); see id. (noting that evidence of a person's
character is inadmissible when offered to prove conduct on a specific occasion "whether in the form of an opinion,
evidence cf reputation, or evidence of specific instances of his conduct"); see also I B.E. WrrKtN, CALIFORNIA
EVIDENCE, Circumstantial Evidence § 325 (3d ed. 1986) (stating the reasons for the exclusionary rule of evidence
is that character evidence is of slight probative value, that character evidence tends to distract the trier of fact, and
that introduction of character evidence may result in the confusion of issues); cf. FED. R. EviD. 404 (providing for
the exclusion of character evidence in federal trials with limited exceptions).
11. See, e.g., CAL. EVID. CODE § 1101o(b) (amended by Chapter 261) (allowing evidence that a person
committed a crime, civil wrong, or other act to be admitted if it is found to be relevant to prove some fact, such as
motive or intent, other than his disposition to commit the act); id. § 1102 (West 1995) (providing that in a criminal
action, an opinion or evidence of a defendant's reputation is admissible if it is offered by the defendant to prove
his or her conduct is in conformity with such evidence, or when it is offered by the prosecution to rebut evidence
admitted by the defendant); id. § 1103(a) (West Supp. 1997) (admitting evidence in the form of an opinion,
evidence of reputation, or evidence of specific instances of conduct when it is offered by the defendant to prove
conduct of the victim is in conformity with the character trait, or when it is offered by the prosecution to rebut the
defendant's evidence); id. § 1103(b) (West Supp. 1997) (allowing the prosecution to rebut defendant's offer
according to § 1103(a) by admitting evidence of defendant's violent behavior, or evidence of defendant's specific
instances cf conduct); id § 1106 (West 1995) (providing that the defendant in a civil action for damages resulting
from sexu2l harassment, sexual assault, or sexual battery, may cross-examine a witness introduced by the plaintiff
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including one that allows evidence regarding the defendant's commission of past
sexual offenses to be offered to prove the disposition of the defendant in an action
charging him with a sexual offense.12 Chapter 261 creates a similar exception that
permits evidence of the defendant's commission of other acts of domestic violence
to be admissible in a criminal action in which the defendant is currently accused of
an offense of domestic violence. 3 The author of Chapter 261 believes that criminal
prosecution is the only way to interrupt the escalating pattern of domestic violence,
and since Chapter 261 allows juries to look at patterns of the defendant's acts of
domestic violence, criminal prosecution will increase. 14
Chapter 261 allows jurors to see a defendant's patterns of domestic violence by
admitting past acts, whether against the current victim or a prior victim, to show the
defendant's disposition to commit acts of domestic violence.1 5 Existing evidentiary
laws are inadequate in the area of domestic violence because other acts of domestic
violence committed by the defendant against the victim, or another victim, are
excluded often due to their prejudicial effect. 6 Even when other acts of domestic
violence are admitted, the inference of defendant's propensity to commit domestic
violence is forbidden. 7 Thus, Chapter 261 prevents jurors from having to conclude
that the current act of domestic violence is an "isolated incident, an accident, or a
mere fabrication."' 8
relating to plaintiff's sexual conduct and may also offer relevant evidence limited specifically to the rebuttal of
plaintiff's evidence). But see id. § 352 (West 1995) (granting the trial judge discretion to exclude evidence if its
probative value is substantially outweighed by the probability that its admission will create a substantial danger of
undue prejudice, confuse the issues, or mislead the jury).
12. Id. § 1108 (West Supp. 1997). See generally Pamela J. Keeler, Review of Selected 1995 California
Legislation, 27 PAC. L. 349, 761 (1996) (describing the effect of allowing evidence of prior sexual offenses
against a defendant to prove a disposition to commit a similar crime).
13. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1109(a) (enacted by Chapter 261); see id. (stating that this evidence shall not be
admitted if it is inadmissible pursuant to § 352); id. § 352 (West 1995) (providing that the trial judge has discretion
to exclude any evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by danger of undue prejudice, confusion
of issues, or of misleading the jury); see also id. § 1109(e) (enacted by Chapter 261) (limiting the admission of
otherwise admissible character evidence relating to defendant's commission of domestic violence to that conduct
which occurred in the last 10 years).
14. See ASSEmLYCOmMTEEONPUBLCSAFETY,COMMmTEEANALYSISOFSB 1876, at4 (June 25, 1996)
(noting that without allowing jurors to see the propensity of defendants to commit acts of domestic violence, "we
will continue to see cases where perpetrators of this violence 'will beat their intimate partners, even kill them, and
go on to beat or kill the next intimate partner").
15. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 1109(a) (enacted by Chapter 261) (providing that evidence of defendant's
commission of other acts of domestic violence is not made inadmissible by § 1101).
16. See CAL. EVmD. CODE § 352 (West 1995) (granting the court discretion to exclude evidence if its
prejudicial effect on the defendant is greater than its possible probative value).
17. ASSEmBLYCOMMrrrEEONPUBLICSAFETY, CoMMrrrEE ANALYSIS OFSB 1876, at 3 (June 25, 1996).
18. Id.; see id. (stating that Chapter 261 accomplishes three objectives: (1) It remedies the California
Evidence Code's inadequacy in domestic violence prosecutions, (2) it gives jurors crucial information needed to
come to proper decisions, and (3) it maintains proper safeguards for defendants).
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Ill. PROTECIONS AFFORDED TO DEFENDANT
Opponents of Chapter 261 argue that character evidence is generally excluded
because of the potential prejudicial effect it places upon the defendant.19 Because the
prosecution must prove that the defendant committed the charged crimes beyond a
reasonable doubt, opponents argue that allowing evidence of prior acts lowers the
burden of proof because the jury may determine that the defendant is more likely to
have committed the current offense charged when the defendant committed these acts
in the past.2
Chapter 261, however, does not eliminate the normal evidentiary safeguards
designed to protect the defendant. First, the evidence of prior domestic violence must
be relevant.21 Second, before the evidence is to be offered, "the people shall disclose
the evidence to the defendant.., at least 30 days before the scheduled date of the
trial."- Additionally, acts occurring more than ten years prior to the charged offense
will not be admissible unless the court finds it to be in the interest of justice. 23
Furthermore, Chapter 261 does not mandate the admission of prior acts of domestic
violence, it merely makes them admissible. Because § 1109(a) specifically makes
reference to California Evidence Code § 352, the trial judge will have to weigh the
prejudicial value of the evidence to admit the evidence?"
Use of the Penal Code definition of domestic violence in Chapter 261 narrows
the scope of the legislation to intimate partners and former intimate partners.2 By
choosing this definition of domestic violence as opposed to the one contained in
19. Id. at 7.
20. Id.; see id. (noting that prosecutors will be able to argue that the defendant's current crime of domestic
violence is consistent with the defendant's character for spousal abuse).
21. See CAL. EViD. CODE § 210 (West 1995) (defining "relevant evidence" as evidence which (1) is relevant
to either the credibility ofa witness or hearsay declarant and (2) has a tendency to prove or disprove any disputed
fact which is of consequence to the determination of the action).
22. Id. § 1109(b) (enacted by Chapter 261); see id. (providing that the evidence offered to the defendant
shall include statements of witnesses or a summary of the substance of any testimony that is expected to be offered
by the people); see also id. (stating that if the defendant shows good cause, then the required disclosure period may
be greater than 30 days).
23. Id. § 1109(e) (enacted by Chapter 261).
24. Id. § 1109(a) (enacted by Chapter 261); see id. (specifically stating that evidence of a defendant's
commission of past acts of domestic violence is admissible only if it is not made inadmissible by § 352); see also
id. § 352 (West 1995) (granting the trial court discretion to exclude evidence if the probative value ofits admission
is substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect).
25. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 13700(b) (West Supp. 1997) (defining "domestic violence" to mean abuse
committed against an adult or fully emancipated minor who is a spouse, former spouse, cohabitant, formcr
cohabitant, or a person with whom the suspect has had a child or is having a dating or engagement relationship);
id. (defining "cohabitant" to mean two unrelated adults living together for some period of time, resulting in some
permanency of relationship); id. (stating that the following are factors used in determining cohabitation: (I) Sexual
relations while sharing the same living quarters, (2) sharing of income or expense, (3) joint use or ownership of
property, (4) the continuity or length of relationship, and (5) whether the "co-residents" hold themselves out to be
husband and wife); see also id. § 13700(a) (West Supp. 1997) (defining "abuse" as intentionally or recklessly
causing or attempting to cause bodily injury).
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Family Code § 6211,26 the authors limit the admissible evidence to conduct "which
is similar in character to the charged domestic violence crime, and which was com-
mitted against the victim of the charged crime or another similarly situated person."
7
Finally, hearsay rules will remain in effect to control what forms of evidence are
admissible.O
IV. CHARACTER EVIDENCE AND THE CONSTITUTION
When character evidence is introduced at trial, it heightens the possibility that a
defendant will be convicted because he is determined to be a "bad person" in the eyes
of the jury rather than on the basis of being found guilty beyond a reasonable doubt
on the merits of the crime.29 Thus, defendants are more likely to be convicted
because of their "status' 30 as domestic abusers when character evidence showing past
acts of domestic violence is admitted.3t "Although the United States Supreme Court
has not passed on the constitutionality of using character evidence to convict, the
Court has expressed great reservations about the use of state power to convict
individuals on account of their status. 3
26. See supra note I (defining "domestic violence" as it appears in California Family Code § 6211).
27. ASSEMBLY COMMITrEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY, COMMITrEE ANALYSIS OF SH 1876, at 5 (June 25, 1996).
Compare supra note 1 (defining "domestic violence' according to the definition contained in California Family
Code § 6211) with supra note 25 (defining "domestic violence" according to the definition contained in the
California Penal Code).
28. See SENATE JUDICIARY CoMMIrrE. CoMMITEE ANALYSIS OF SB 1876, at 6 (May 7, 1996) (arguing
that the interests of the defendant are protected because existing protections afforded to a defendant, such as
restrictions on hearsay evidence, are not impaired by Chapter 261); see also CAL. EVIl. CODE § 1200(a) (West
1995) (defining "hearsay evidence" as evidence of a statement that was made other than by a witness while
testifying at the hearing and that is offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted); id. § 1200(b) (West 1995)
(stating that except as provided by law, hearsay evidence is inadmissible); SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE,
COMMrrrEE ANALYSIS OF SB 1876, at 6 (May 7, 1996) (stating that a primary candidate for evidence of past acts
of domestic violence will be the existence of a temporary restraining order, and that this evidence is generally
regarded as hearsay). But see CAL. EVIW. CODE § 1300 (West 1995) (providing that a final court judgment of a
felony conviction is admissible to prove any fact essential to that judgment because it is "peculiarly reliable" and
the seriousness of the crime charged "assures the facts will be thoroughly litigated").
29. SENATECOMMrEEONCRMALPROCEDURF, COMMrrrEEANALYSIS OFSB 1876, at 6 (Apr. 23, 1996);
see supra note 20 and accompanying text (stating that the prosecution's burden of proof is lowered when evidence
of defendant's prior acts of domestic violence are admissible at trial).
30. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1410 (6th ed. 1990) (defining "status crime" as "a class of crime which
consists not in proscribed action or inaction, but in the accused's having a certain personal condition or being a
person of a specified character," and giving vagrancy as an example of a status crime); see also WEBSTER'S THIRD
NEW INTERNATIONALDICTIONARY 2230 (1981) (defining "status" as the condition (arising out of crime) of a person
that determines the nature of his legal relations to the state).
31. SENATECOMMnrrEEON CRMNALPROCEDUR, COMMrrEE ANALYSIS OFSB 1876, at 6 (Apr. 23.1996);
see id. at 7 (noting that the status offense in this case could be having a prior criminal conviction for similar
conduct, for instance domestic violence, charged in the case in question).
32. Id. at 6-7; see Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 667 (1962) (holding that a state law which
imprisons a person due to his status of being addicted to drugs, even though he may never have used or possessed
drugs in the state, "inflicts a cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment").
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In Robinson v. California,33 the Supreme Court held that the Fourteenth
Amendment precludes a state from convicting an individual due to his status of being
addicted to narcotics?4 The statute in question punished the status of narcotic
addiction as a criminal offense. 5 The statute did not punish a person for the use of
narcotics, nor for the purchase, sale, or possession of them.36
The problem with this statute was that an offender could be "continuously guilty
of this offense;" regardless of whether the offender had ever bought or possessed
narcotics in California he could be prosecuted "at any time before he reform[ed]. 37
The Court analogized this to making it a criminal offense for a person to be mentally
ill or to have a disease, both of which would "doubtless be universally thought to be
an infliction of cruel and unusual punishment."38
By allowing evidence of past acts of domestic violence to be admissible as
character evidence against a defendant in a present action for domestic violence,
Chapter 261 could be found to violate the Eighth Amendment prohibition against
cruel and unusual punishment. It allows a defendant to be convicted by a jury
(informed of defendant's history of domestic violence) due to his status as a domestic
violence offender. However, drawing an analogy between the status of committing
acts of domestic violence and the status of narcotic addiction or vagrancy is a
superfluous comparison. Drug addiction and vagrancy are examples of personal
conditions for which one should not be punished, whereas domestic violence is a
crime defined by a proscribed action, namely abuse against one's spouse, for which
one should be punished.39 Therefore, Chapter 261 is likely to be found to punish
people because of their present acts of domestic violence, rather than due to their
status of being a domestic violence offender, and thus should not be violative of the
Eighth Amendment.
V. CONCLUSION
Chapter 261 amends the Evidence Code to allow circumstantial evidence of a
defendant's character to be used against him or her in a present action for domestic
violence.4 The amendments to the Evidence Code were made in response to the
33. 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
34. Robinson, 370 U.S. at 667.
35. Id. at 666; see id. (interpreting California Health and Safety Code § 11721, repealed in 1972 and
replaced by California Health and Safety Code § 11550); see also CAL HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11550 (West
1995) (providing that it shall be a misdemeanor for any person to use or be under the influence of a controlled
substance or narcotic drug).
36. Robinson, 370 U.S. at 666.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. See supra note 30 (defining "status crime" as a crime which consists of having a certain per;onal
condition or character, not a crime consisting of proscribed actions like domestic violence); see also supra note 25
(defining the crime of "domestic violence" as consisting of the proscribed action of abuse against a spouse).
40. CAL. EvID. CODE § 1101(a) (amended by Chapter 261).
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difficulties associated with proving and convicting defendants of domestic violence,
a major problem in today's society.41 Since Chapter 261 was modeled after California
Evidence Code § 1108, which allows evidence of a defendant's past sexual offenses
to be used in a current action for a sexual offense, it seems that it will survive any
challenges posed.
APPENDIX
Code Sections Affected
Evidence Code § 1109 (new), § 1101 (amended).
SB 1876 (Solis); 1996 STAT. Ch. 261
41. See supra notes 2-3 and accompanying text.
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Beyond the Reach of the Courts?: The Constitution,
Retroactivity, and Childhood Sexual Abuse
Christine M. Adams
[l]t must be remembered that legislatures are ultimate guardians of the
liberties and welfare of the people in quite as great a degree as the courts.!
I. INTRODUCTION
Awareness of the prevalence of childhood sexual abuse is increasing,2 but the
infrequent conviction of perpetrators of such abuse has been repeatedly demon-
strated.3 A primary reason that perpetrators of alleged childhood sexual abuse remain
criminally unaccountable for their actions is the running of the statute of limitations. 4
Because of the increased recognition of the pervasiveness of childhood sexual abuse,
several states' legislatures have sought to provide a means for redressing past wrongs
by amending or eliminating the statute of limitations for causes of action based on
childhood sexual abuse.5 In California, Chapter 130 is the latest example of such
legislative action.6 Since the retroactive application of a statutory limitation period
1. Missouri, Kan., & Tex. R.R. v. May, 194 U.S. 267,270 (1904) (Holmes, J.).
2. See NATIONAL LEGAL RESOURCE CENTER FOR CHILD ADVOCACY AND PROTECTION, CHILD SEXUAL
ABUSE: LEGAL ISSUES AND APPROACHES (rev. ed. 1981) (revealing that a national study has found that one-third
of the Unitel States population has experienced some form of childhood sexual abuse); see also Meridith F. Sopher,
"The Best of All Possible Worlds": Balancing Victims' and Defendants' Rights in the Child Sexual Abuse Case,
63 FORDHAMI L. REv. 633,634 n.12, 635 n.17 (1994) (providing citation reporting that between 3% to 38% of the
population experience sexual abuse while a minor, and additionally noting the increase in reports of molestation
and the number of children referred to sexual assault centers); Nina Darton et al., The Pain of the Last Taboo,
NEWSWEEK, Oct. 7, 1991, at 70 (reporting the results of a prominent psychologist's study, finding that 27% of the
women and 16% of the men surveyed revealed a history of sexual trauma experienced as a child).
3. Sopher, supra note 2, at 643 n.71; see id. (noting the infrequent rate of conviction).
4. See Susan J. Hall, Adult Repression of Childhood Sexual Assault, 22 N.C. CENT. L.. 31, 44 (1996)
(explaining that expiration of a claim for childhood sexual abuse often occurs (citing Rebecca L. Thomas, Adult
Survivors of Childhood SexualAbuse and Statutes ofLimitations, 2 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 1245, 1246 (1991))).
5. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 15-3-5(a)(4) (1995) (foregoing imposition of a statutory limitation period
completely for all felonies, which includes specified sex crimes); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-1-109(h) (Michie 1995)
(tolling the statute of limitations until the victim is eighteen); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-110(2) (Supp. 1994) (extending
the statute of limitations by seven years if the victim is under the age of sixteen); OR. REV. STAT. § 131.125(2)
(1990) (providing that when the victim is less than sixteen, the statute is tolled until the age of sixteen is reached
or the crime is reported); see also Gary M. Emsdorff & Elizabeth F. Loftus, Let Sleeping Memories Lie? Words
of Caution About Tolling the Statute of Limitations in Cases of Memory Repression, 84 L CRIM. L. & CRMIINOLOGY
129, 150-53 (1993) (providing citation and detailed discussion of the recent legislative initiative in this area, and
noting that states have extended, tolled, or eliminated the statutory limitation periods applicable to childhood sexual
offense).
6. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 803 (amended by Chapter 130) (applying retroactively a statutory period of
one year from time of reporting childhood sexual abuse to the filing time of criminal charges).
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has generated confusion and has received disparate treatment in the courts, this
Legislative Note provides an analysis of the legislation, legal history, and constitu-
tionality of newly enacted Chapter 130.
II. ANALYSIS OF CHAPTER 130
Before Chapter 130 was enacted, a minor was permitted to initiate a criminal
complaint within one year of the date that the minor reported the specified sex
crimes.7 Additionally, a person of any age was authorized to file a criminal complaint
alleging that the person was a victim of specified sex crimes while a minor In
response to judicial reception of retroactive application of prior law,9 Chapter 130
expressly states the legislative intent to make the statutory limitation periods for
commencing criminal actions in both instances retroactive, effectively reviving
previously time-barred causes of action in specified circumstances.'0
Proponents of Chapter 130 feel the measure is necessary to combat the judicial
response to the retroactive application of a 1993 amendment to California Evidence
Code § 803 and to clarify legislative intent in this area."
Many people agree that providing an aggrieved the opportunity to seek justice
in court against the perpetrator of childhood sexual abuse is necessary and de-
sirable.'2 There exists, however, serious concerns about reviving previously time-
barred criminal causes of action.' 3 This Legislative Note continues by addressing the
legal background of the retroactive application of statute of limitation periods' 4 and
the constitutional 5 and pragmatic' 6 concerns such retroactivity raises.
7. 1993 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 390, sec. I(f), at 1855 (amending CAL. PENAL CODE § 803).
8. Id.
9. See infra notes 23, 28-60 and accompanying text (providing the details of several federal and state court
decisions dealing with childhood sexual abuse and retroactive statutes of limitation).
10. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 803 (amended by Chapter 130); see id. § 803(f), (g) (amended by Chapter 130)
(specifying the circumstances under which a revived cause of action exists and the statutory period for filing a
criminal complaint against the alleged perpetrator of the abuse).
11. SENATE RULES COMMrITEE, COMMrrrEE ANALYSIS OF AB 2014, at 1 (June 17, 1996); see 1993 Cal.
Legis. Serv. ch. 390, at 1854-55 (amending CAL. PENAL CODE § 803).
12. See Emsdorff & Loftus, supra note 5, at 140-41 (stating that such causes of action reflect society's
willingness to impose accountability for the sexual abuse of children); see also Sopher, supra note 2, at 640-42
(discussing arguments supporting criminal prosecution).
13. See Tyson v. Tyson, 727 P.2d 226,227 (Wash. 1986) (expressing concern over allowing an action after
extended time had elapsed); see also Emsdorff & Loftus, supra note 5, at 154-62 (describing the concern over the
accuracy of later remembered events and the potential of therapist bias).
14. See infra Part III.
15. See infra Part V.A., B.
16. See infra Part V.
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I. LEGAL BACKGROUND
In 1993, the California Legislature enacted a law which eliminated the statute of
limitations on child molestation.1 7 The author of that bill introduced Chapter 130 to
combat the inefficacy of several attempts by survivors of childhood abuse to bring
legal action against the perpetrator of their abuse. Several California courts have
dismissed cases against defendants where the statute of limitations applicable at the
time the alleged sexual abuse occurred had expired.' 9 These courts noted that under
principles of statutory construction, the newly enacted statute of limitations were not
intended to be applied as suggested by the prosecution. 20 Furthermore, one court held
that if the statute of limitation period enacted by the prior amendment to § 803 was
found to evince a legislative intent to make it retroactively applicable, a violation of
ex post facto law2' existed, prohibiting such retroactive application. " Due to a recent
court's examination of the issue, it warrants extensive examination' Initially,
however, the foundational cases for the nonretroactive application principle will be
explored.24
Providing the statutory backdrop for the cases that follow is the history behind
California Penal Code § 803(g).25 Added to the Penal Code in 1993 and effective
January 1, 1994, § 803(g) extended the statutory limitation for filing a criminal com-
plaint charging the commission of a sex crime.2 Under the amended subdivision, the
statute of limitations was extended for persons reporting sexual abuse committed
17. 1993 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 390, sec. l(f) at 1855 (amending CAL. PENAL CODE § 803).
18. See SENATE RULES COMMITEE, COMMfIm ANALYSIS OFAB 2014, at 3 (June 17, 1996) (claiming that
various rulings by the California Court of Appeal have resulted in the double victimization of children; the children
were sexually abused and later prohibited by the court from seeking judicial recourse due to time lapse).
19. See infra notes 29-30 and accompanying text (elaborating on various cases dismissing causes of action
based on childhood sexual abuse).
20. See infra note 29 and accompanying text (discussing cases that have relied upon requirements of express
legislative intent to retroactively apply newly enacted provisions).
21. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9 (prohibiting ex post facto laws); CAL. CONsT. art. 1, § 9 (containing the same
prohibition); see also Tapia v. Superior Court (State), 53 Cal. 3d 282,295, 807 P.2d 434,441,279 Cal. Rptr. 592,
599 (1991) (stating that the California and federal provisions are essentially the same). See generally Collins v.
Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37, 42-43 (1991) (defining an "ex post facto law" as one that punishes as criminal an act
innocent when committed, increases the burden for a crime after commission, or eliminates a defense existing at
the time the offense was committed (citing Beazell v. Ohio, 269 U.S. 167, 169-170 (1925))).
22. See infra notes 38-40 (reviewing People v. Sowers, 40 Cal. App. 4th 1478,48 Cal. Rptr. 2d 250 (1095)).
23. See People v. Sowers, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d 250 (1995), rev. granted, 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d 83 (1996) (holding
that retroactive application was not violative of ex post facto guarantees).
24. See infra notes 29,32,39 and accompanying text (examining cases dismissing criminal actions initiated
after the statutory limitation period applicable when the alleged act transpired had elapsed).
25. See 1993 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 390, sec. 1(f), at 1855 (amending CAL. PENAL CODE § 803) (changing
the statutory limitation period for enumerated sexual offenses, as specified).
26. Id.; see id. (providing that a criminal complaint may be filed within one year of reporting childhood
sexual abuse, as specified).
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against them while a minor, under specified circumstances, for a period of one year
within which to file a criminal complaint.27
The California Court of Appeal for the Second District held, in Lynch v. Superior
Court,28 that the revival and extension of a statutory limitation period that had
expired under the formerly applicable Penal Code section was barred by a correlative
Penal Code section, as well as by ex post facto prohibitions.29 The court dismissed
the prosecution of eight counts of lewd acts upon a child?3
Five months later, the Sixth District had an opportunity to adjudicate a similar
issue. In People v. Regules,31 the court sustained a demurrer to twenty-four counts
of sex acts again'st minors as a violation of the ex post facto clause.32 The court dis-
cussed numerous cases in California where the extension of a criminal statute of
limitations period which had not yet expired was not violative of the Constitution to
lend support to their decision that an extension of a statutory period that had expired
was violative of the Constitution.33 In particular, the court relied on Judge Learned
Hand's explanation in Falter v. United State? that the revival of barred prosecution
would seem unfair while the extension of a limitation period not yet expired may not
be.35 Additionally, the court distinguished the United States Supreme Court Collins
v. Youngblood opinion which clarified and narrowed ex post facto protection?
6
A few short months after the Regules court held that retroactive application of
California Penal Code § 803(g) violated the ex post facto clause of the Constitution,
the Court of Appeal for the Fourth District questioned that result?7 Although the
court held that the prosecution for crimes for which the statutory limitation period
27. Id.
28. 33 Cal. App. 4th 1223,39 Cal. Rptr. 2d 414 (1995).
29. Lynch, 33 Cal. App. 4th at 1226-28, 39 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 415-16 (holding that a criminal statutory
limitation period may be extended before expiration but not after expiration; and also stating that California Penal
Code § 805.5(c)(1) also prohibited application of newly enacted California Penal Code § 803 since it expressly
retained limitation periods applicable before the new section became operative).
30. Id. at 1228-29,39 Cal. Rptr. 2d at417.
31. 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d 688, rev. granted, 905 P.2d 418,46 Cal. Rptr. 2d 749 (1995).
32. Regules, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 691; see id.(affirming the refusal to reinstate the complaint against the
defendant).
33. See id. at 689 (discussing cases relying on Learned Hand's explanation in Falter v. United States, 23
F.2d 420 (1928), that reviving an expired cause of action is different than extending the time in which to file a
complaint under an existing cause of action). The Regules court, however, ignores an additional comment by Judge
Hand that suggests the appropriateness of determining how much violence is done to fairness and justice by reviving
such an action. See id.
34. 23 F.2d 420 (1928).
35. Regules, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 689; see id. (citing examples of California court decisions following Falter).
36. See id. at 690 (distinguishing the Collins decision); see also Collins, 497 U.S. at 41-52 (declaring the
proper applicability of an ex post facto analysis to statutes that punish an act as criminal that was innocent when
committed, increase the burden for a crime after commission, or eliminate a defense available existing at the time
of commission). The statute must fit one of these three categories to warrant analysis under the Constitution.
Collins, 497 U.S. at 41-52.
37. See People v. Sowers, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d 250 (1995), rev. granted, 912 P.2d 534, 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d 83
(1996).
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had run was prohibited,38 the court relied on principles of statutory construction to
reach that result.39 Regarding retroactivity, significant emphasis was placed on the
absence of any express language to apply California Penal Code § 803(g) to the
instant case to negate California Penal Code § 3, which explicitly states that no part
of the Penal Code shall be retroactively applied absent such expression.o
The court then addressed the respondent's ex post facto argument. Assuming
arguendo that express application of California Penal Code § 803(g) to the instant
case was found, the court clearly differentiated between retroactive legislation and
ex post facto violation."
The Sowers court suggests that insofar as the Lynch and Regules cases were
decided on ex post facto violation grounds, the United States Supreme Court decision
in Collins undermines those decisions.'2 In the Collins case, the Supreme Court
narrowed the definition of what constituted an ex post facto law under the United
States Constitution.' 3 The Court held that to fall within the traditional notion of ex
post facto analysis, the criminal statute would have to punish a previously innocent
act as criminal, make punishment for a crime more burdensome, or deprive an
accused of a defense available at the time of commission of the offense.
4
Courts have relied on the third definition of an ex post facto law as provided in
the Collins decision to find that eliminating a defense of expiration of a statutory
limitation period violates the ex post facto clause.5 Explicitly addressing the
meaning of "defense" as it fits within the scope of an ex post facto analysis, the
decision in Lynch does not comport with the explication of "defense" as provided in
Collins.46 The Lynch court found elimination of a statute of limitations defense
analogous to a substantive right protected by the constitutional prohibition against
an ex post facto law. 47 The Collins court admitted that even if a right is considered
38. See id. at 252 n.4, 255-56 (concluding that the prosecution of a crime for which the statutory limitation
period applicable before legislation changing that statute was effective is offensive to rules of statutory construction
by relying on Evangelatos v. Superior Court (State), 44 Cal. 3d 1188,753 P.2d 585, 246 Cal. Rptr. 629 (1988)).
39. See id. at 255-56.
40. See id. at 255 (discussing the relationship between California Penal Code § 803(g) and the presumptions
attached to legislative statutes).
41. See id. at 252-53 (clarifying that even if a statute is not found to be ex post facto it could nevertheless
be retroactive).
42. rd. at 252 nA.
43. See Collins, 497 U.S. at 41-44; see also infra notes 45,47 and accompanying text (detailing the analysis
of the ex post facto claim in Collins).
44. Collins, 497 U.S. at 41-44.
45. See supra notes 29, 32, 39 and accompanying text (providing examples of such cases); see also Sowers,
48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 252 n.4 (questioning the result in several cases relying on the third ex post facto definition,
namely eliminating a then-existing defense).
46. See Collins, 497 U.S. at 51-52 (limiting an ex post facto analysis to statutes pertaining to the definition
of crimes, defenses, or punishments).
47. See Lynch, 33 Cal. App. 4th at 1228, 39 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 416 (holding that protection against greater
punishment imposed after the offense was committed than was previously applicable is analogous to elimination
of a substantive defense).
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"substantial," that alone is insufficient to bring it within an ex post facto analysis48
Regules rejects the analysis requirement under Collins, distinguishing the types of
statutes involved in the litigation.49 In addition, the Regules court noted the different
judicial opinions regarding whether the statute of limitations is an element of the
crime so as to bring it within the protection of the ex post facto analysis previously
established in Collins.5 The Regules court, however, avoided deciding whether or
not it believed that the statute of limitations is an element of the crime by stating that
the "well settled" rule barring a revival or extension of an expired statutory period
would be followed.5'
In addressing the ex post facto argument, the Sowers court found the ex post
facto analysis of Collins controlling, relying on a California Supreme Court decision
that interpreted the California and federal ex post facto clauses identically.52 The
court found that the case at bar presented no question under the Collins ex post facto
analysis.53
Finally, in People v. Maloy,54 the Fifth District found retroactive application of
§ 803(g) of the California Penal Code did not violate ex post facto provisions. 55 The
Maloy court adopted the ex post facto definition found in Collins and, applying the
three category approach, found that the change in the California Penal Code, as
applied to the case at bar, did not fit that definition.56
These cases reveal the confusion in the lower courts regarding statutory
limitation periods, ex post facto analysis, and retroactivity. The current state of
judicial affairs in California regarding these issues reveals the need for supreme court
disposition. Currently, the Regules and Sowers cases are pending review by the
Supreme Court of California.57
48. Collins, 497 U.S. at 51.
49. See Regules, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 690.
50. Id. at 691 nn.4-5; see id. (noting the different views regarding whether the limitation period is an element
of the crime).
51. Seeid.
52. See Sowers, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 255-56.
53. See id. at 253-54 (distinguishing between ex post facto and retroactive laws and failing to provide any
ex post facto analysis of the case at bar).
54. 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d 691, rev. granted, 905 P.2d 993.47 Cal. Rptr. 2d (1995).
55. See Maloy, 44 Cal Rptr. 2d at 700 (explaining that retroactive application would not necessarily offend
the ex post facto clause).
56. See id. at 699 (construing the change in law not violative of the categories established in Collins); supra
notes 37, 38, 44-50 and accompanying text (discussing the Collins case).
57. People v. Sowers, 912 P.2d 534,51 Cal. Rptr. 2d 83 (1996); People v. Regules, 905 P.2d 418,46 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 749 (1995).
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IV. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF CHAPTR 130
Chapter 130 explicitly provides for retroactive application to causes of action
arising before the effective date of the enacted provisions.5 8 A statutory construction
analysis based on lack of legislative clarity, as demonstrated in Lynch and Sowers,
is therefore unnecessary. What remains, however, are interesting questions regarding
the intricacies of several constitutional provisions. Given the lack of clear standards
enunciated in California court analyses of the constitutionality of statutory retro-
activity, this Legislative Note will address various issues raising constitutional
concerns.
A. The Ex Post Facto Clause and Chapter 130
While the Collins case illustrated that reliance on the deprivation of a "sub-
stantial" right alone is insufficient to warrant ex post facto protection,5" an analysis
of whether a statutory limitation defense involves the definition of a crime, a defense
to a crime, or punishment of a crime, thus invoking ex post facto analysis, is
required. As illustrated by the Regules case, disposition in California courts regarding
this issue is unsettled.60 Where prior law is unsettled, there is arguably no justifiable
reliance on it. Absent justifiable reliance, it could be argued that retroactive
application of changed limitations periods on unsettled law is not improper.
Additionally, the United States Supreme Court held that the statute of limitations
relates to a remedy rather than a right, and that retroactive revival of a previously
barred action merely frustrates a hope that a defense exists.61 If these arguments
could be implemented successfully, Chapter 130 would probably survive an attack
under the ex post facto clause.
B. Retroactivity and the Due Process Clause
Of the cases examining changes in the statutory limitation period applicable to
prosecution of perpetrators of childhood sexual abuse, no court has reached the issue
of a due process violation.62 As examined in the Sowers and Collins cases, the
58. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 803(f)(1). (g)(1) (amended by Chapter 130) (allotting a one-year period
following the report of victimization to file a criminal action).
59. See Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37, 51-52 (holding that the deprivation of a jury trial, although
identified as implicating a substantial right, is insufficient to find an ex post facto violation).
60. See supra note 50 and accompanying text (illustrating disparate judicial treatment as to whether the
statute of limitation is such an element).
61. See Chase Sec. Corp. v. Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304, 315 (1945) (holding that the limitation period
ordinarily relates to remedies, not rights, and concluding that remedies are not included within the protection under
an ex post facto analysis).
62. Due process protection is afforded under the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution. See
U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV. The California Constitution also contains the guarantee. See CAL. CONST. art. 1, §§ 7,
15; see also DeShaney v. Department of Social Sers., 489 U.S. 189, 194-97 (1989) (elaborating on the purpose
Pacific Law Journal / Vol. 28
distinction between "substantial" and "procedural" law is moot regarding an ex post
facto analysis. 63 Regarding a due process claim, however, a deprivation of a vested
right or substantial impairment of such right denies due process of law in violation
of the Federal and California Constitutions.4 While retroactivity lacks any clear
definition, it is related to the above point as follows. When the impact of a law
substantially changes the legal significance of events transpiring before the law
becomes effective, or interferes with rights existing before the law became effective,
the courts have held that such a law is retroactive.65 In examining retroactive laws
with an emphasis on a due process analysis, several factors must be weighed to
determine if the retroactivity, as applied to the case at bar, is violative of due process
protection.6
Examining the primary factors given by the Flournoy court to evaluate a
potential violation reveals that Chapter 130 is unlikely to be found constitutionally
infirm.67 Chapter 130 serves a significant state interest in providing a forum for its
citizens to redress past wrongs, as well as punishing and deterring future crimes of
sexual abuse of minors. Since childhood sexual abuse is often repressed,6 the retro-
active application of Chapter 130 is important in effectuating the aforementioned
purpose.69 Viewed together, the foregoing factors would seem to tip the scales toward
constitutional retroactive application of Chapter 130.
behind due process protection, particularly noting preventing the abuse of state power against citizens); Lassiter
v. Department of Social Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 24-25, 27-28 (1981) (discussing the process a court undertakes to
evaluate a due process claim).
63. See Collins, 497 U.S. at 46 (declaring that reliance on "substantial" or "procedural" analysis is no longer
proper).
64. See Flournoy v. State, 230 Cal. App. 2d 532,41 Cal. Rptr. 198 (1965) (listing the following factors for
consideration in retroactivity cases: (1) The nature and strength of the policy interest served by the retroactive
statute, (2) the extent to which the statute changes or eliminates the asserted right in existence prior to the statute,
and (3) the nature of the right which the statute alters). The last factor includes elements of reliance and expectation
and requires explanation in the context of this Legislative Note. See id. at 536-37, 41 Cal. Rptr. at 200-01. This
factor, to some, involves whether or not justifiable reliance upon, and engaging in behavior in expectation of, the
continuation of a previously-existing right are infringed upon to such a degree that a change or elimination of the
right would equate to "surprise' legislation. Id. Applied to this discussion, the criminal defendant would argue that
there was justifiable reliance on the statute of limitations having run and that action was taken in expectation of that
expiration. Weighed against this assertion would be the various state interests in providing a forum for redressability
of past wrongs to state citizens and the necessity of deterring similar crimes in the future.
65. See cases cited infra notes 68-73.
66. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Bouquet, 16 Cal. 3d 583, 591,546 P.2d 1371, 1376, 128 Cal. Rptr. 427,431-
32 (1976) (considering various factors in determining the legitimacy of a retroactive law); Flournoy, 230 Cal. App.
2d at 532, 41 Cal. Rptr. at 198 (same).
67. See supra note 64 (listing applicable factors).
68. See infra Part V (containing a discussion of the repression of childhood sexual trauma).
69. See Hall, supra note 4, at 44 (focusing discussion of the infrequency of conviction in childhood sexual
assault cases within an analysis of statutory limitation periods, and suggesting that if the passage of time did not
have the legal effect of barring a claim, the potential to bring successful suits would improve). Additionally, policy
factors can weigh in the balance and provide a foundation for constitutional retroactive application of law. See
Flournoy, 230 Cal. App. 2d at 525,41 Cal. Rptr. at 195.
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This, however, is not the end of the analysis. Weighed against these factors are:
(1) The extent of justifiable reliance upon former law, (2) the extent actions have
been taken in such reliance, and (3) the disrupting effect a retroactive application of
the law would have on such actions. 7° Arguably, it is general knowledge that
statutory limitation periods exist for most crimes. Whether or not a perpetrator relies
on such statutory limitation periods justifiably and acts in accordance with such
'reliance is purely conjectural. Recognizing that retroactive application of California
Penal Code § 803(f) and § 803(g) will disrupt the alleged perpetrator's freedom from
prosecution under the formerly applicable statutory limitation period, it is, however,
not likely that it disrupts actions taken in reliance on former law regarding expiration
of statutory limitation periods. Considering the lack of judicial clarity on this subject,
reliance on nonretroactivity principles would therefore be unjustified. Thus
examined, Chapter 130 does not seem violative of due process. The decision of the
legislature to retroactively apply newly enacted statutes of limitation periods
effectuates legitimate interests of the state without unduly infringing on the justified
expectations of an alleged perpetrator of sex crimes against a minor.
C. Statutorily Created v. Constitutionally Guaranteed Rights
An additional point deserves examination. Statutes of limitations are not
constitutionally demanded, but rather are concessions by a state or federal govern-
ment that prosecution beyond a specified time will not be commenced?' However,
as a statutorily created right of defense, these provisions can be modified or repealed
without offending a vested or substantial right.72 Viewed this way, the retroactive
application of Chapter 130 repeals a statutorily created defense of expiration of the
statute of limitation period as it previously existed. As such, it may be viewed as
constitutionally permissible.
V. REPRESSION AND CHAPTER 130-PRAGMATIC CONCERNS
Repression of childhood sexual abuse is not uncommon! 3 Different psycho-
logical theories have been posited to explain this phenomenon and documentation
70. Bouquet, 16 Cal. 3d at 592,546 P.2d at 1376, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 432.
71. BLA.CK'SLAWDICTIONARY 927 (6th ed. 1990); see Tyson v. Tyson, 727 P.2d 226, 227-28 (Wash. 1986)
(discussing that the purpose behind the statute of limitations is to ensure reliability of evidence, providing protection
against claims filed beyond a time that a reasonable defense can be mounted, and encouraging swift adjudication).
72. See Graczyk v. Worker's Compensation Appeals Bd., 184 Cal. App. 3d 997, 1007-08, 229 Cal. Rptr.
494, 501-02 (1986) (discussing fully a repeal of a statutory right, and finding the destruction of a statutory right not
improper).
73. See generally Hall, supra note 4 (providing a thorough discussion of repression, including cites to
various psychological studies explicating the phenomena).
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exists in several arenas verifying its existence.!' While the ideological foundations
of psychological theory is beyond the scope of this discussion, the legal impact of
repression of childhood sexual trauma as it relates to Chapter 130 warrants ex-
ploration. This discussion will explore how Chapter 130 relates to later retrieval of
repressed memories and the tolling of statutes of limitations, the reliability of later
retrieval, and the implications of tolling on the constitutional protections afforded a
criminal defendant.
A. Judicial Treatment of Repression's Effect on Tolling
1. Civil Actions
The "delayed discovery rule 75 applied in civil actions to prevent the injustice of
dismissing an otherwise valid claim because of the passage of an arbitrary time
period has recently been used by adult survivors of childhood sexual abuse with
modest success. 76 Utilizing this principle, the memory of sexual trauma experienced
as a minor was "undiscovered" and "undiscoverable" before later retrieval." Upon
"discovery," the victim learns the origin of injury and is allowed to initiate civil
action against the alleged perpetrator of that injury.78 Several states, including
California, have adopted legislation tolling the statute of limitations for initiation of
civil suits alleging childhood sexual abuse. 9
2. Criminal Actions
In contrast to the treatment of defendants in civil actions, arduous attention is
directed toward protecting the constitutional rights of the defendant in a criminal
74. See hi at31-34 (briefly describing behaviorism, cognition theory, symbolic interactionism, and Freudian
psychoanalytic theory as the various psychological theories providing the foundation for understanding repression);
see also Emsdorff & Loftus, supra note 5, at 129 nn.l-6 (citing numerous sources of collected data regarding
repression of childhood sexual abuse).
75. See Norrie Clevenger, Statue of Limitations, 30 J. FAM. L. 447,455 & n.40 (1992) (explaining that the
"delayed discovery" rule provides that a cause of action accrues when the plaintiff discovers, or through due
diligence should have discovered, injury by the defendant); see also Hall, supra note 4, at 47 (explaining that
allowing an adult the opportunity to prove abuse occurred and prove the defendant was the abuser is the purpose
behind the "delayed discovery" rule).
76. Originally used in medical malpractice cases, civil suit plaintiffs have been afforded the ability to use
the rule to combat the unfairness of barring an otherwise colorable claim. See Emsdorff & Loftus, supra note 5,
at 144-45 & n.93 (discussing the "delayed discovery" rule and other equitable relief theories successfully utilized
in civil cases to circumvent the statutory limitation expiration).
77. See id. at 142-43 (noting that the inability to discover injury present in medical malpractice cases is
analogous to the repressed memory of childhood sexual abuse).
78. See i at 143 (explaining the "discovery" principle). See generally Clevenger, supra note 76 (examining
the applicability of this rule in instances of alleged childhood sexual abuse).
79. See, e.g., CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 340.1(a) (West Supp. 1997) (providing three years from date of
discovery for initiation of civil suits).
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proceeding. In affording such protection, criminal statutes of limitation periods
possess traditions of impenetrability?' The purpose of such a limitation period and
the ramifications of a verdict returned against the defendant provide the foundation
for rejecting a "delayed discovery rule" in criminal cases.
The "continuing crime" and "concealment" theories have been posited to circum-
vent otherwise rigid tolling principles applicable to criminal statutes of limitations,
as found in sexual offense statutes.81 These arguments, however, have not met with
the acceptance the "delayed discovery rule" is gaining in the judiciary, and relatively
few criminal cases have been able to show justification for tolling a criminal
statutory limitation period.82
B. Implications of Recent Legislative Response
In the context of childhood sexual abuse, the validity of adhering to the rigidity
of criminal statutory limitation periods as it relates to defendant protection can be
legitimately criticized. Furthermore, various state legislatures are responding to what
is perceived as an unjust benefit to an alleged perpetrator of sexual abuse of minors
by eliminating or modifying applicable statutory limitation periods in cases of child-
hood sexual abuse.83 While this response is welcomed, even applauded, aggressive
initiative absent rational and comprehensive legislation could pose difficulty. Several
troubling issues emerge when the purpose behind protections traditionally afforded
a criminal defendant are ignored.
1. Authenticity and Reliability-Later Recall Difficulties
Since later recall of repressed memories is potentially subject to numerous
altering influences, the authenticity of the alleged events can be justifiably ques-
tioned. One purpose of criminal statutory limitation periods is to ensure the trier-of-
fact that the evidence possesses qualities enabling correct resolution.!4 As time
passes, memories fade and the potential for proving a case or defending against one
diminishes. The ability to rely on evidence presented with no temporal proximity to
80. See Toussie v. United States, 397 U.S. 112, 115 (1970) (liberally interpreting limitation periods in favor
of repose, and thus protecting the criminal defendant).
81. See infra note 83 (discussing two such cases).
82. See, e.g., Crider v. State, 531 N.E.2d 1151, 1154 (Ind. 1988) (using the "concealment" theory to toll the
statute of limitations); State v. Danielski, 348 N.W.2d 352, 356 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984) (allowing the "continuing
theory" in a criminal proceeding).
83. See, e.g., Emsdorff & Loftus, supra note 5, at 151 n.1 17 (citing several legislative responses to the
tolling issue).
84. See Tyson v. Tyson, 727 P.2d 227, 227-28 (Wash. 1986) (noting the purpose of the ex post facto
guarantee).
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the alleged crime is weakened. The recognition of these factors provides the
foundation for the very principles of time barring stale claims!5
2. How Chapter 130 Addresses the Issues
California Penal Code § 803(g) provides that persons, regardless of age, alleging
they were the victim of specified crimes may file a criminal complaint within one
year of reporting such abuse, as specified. The qualifications in this subsection
arguably provide the authentication and reliability protection required in the context
of later recalled childhood sexual abuse as the basis for a present cause of action. In
such cases, Chapter 130 would revive any cause of action previously time barred
under California Penal Code § 800 or § 801 and provides a six-month window of
opportunity to report sexual victimization as a minor.87 Within one year of such a
report, a criminal complaint may be filed 8
VI. CONCLUSION
Chapter 130 allows a victim of childhood sexual abuse a day in court; it does not
abrogate other available defenses and does not assure the plaintiff a successful suit
against the alleged perpetrator of the abuse. The burden of proof, evidentiary
requirements, and other protections afforded a criminal defendant remain intact. In
sum, while judicial inconsistency exists in this emotionally charged area of law,
avenues exist to provide plaintiffs a forum to redress past wrongs while protecting
a criminal defendant against arbitrary prosecution8 9 With legislative clarity and
social resolve to eradicate this pervasive, yet often unredressed crime, laws retro-
actively modifying or eliminating statute of limitation periods will probably be found
constitutionally permissible as effectuating legitimate interests of the state without
undue burden. Recognizing this, it is likely that Chapter 130 will be upheld as
constitutional.
85. Id.
86. CAL. PENAL CODE § 803(g) (amended by Chapter 130); see id. (providing that § 803(g) applies when
the general criminal limitation period in California Penal Code § 800 or § 801 has expired and, inter alia,
independent evidence exists that corroborates the victim's allegation in satisfaction of a "clear and convincing"
burden of proof standard).
87. Id.; see id. (specifying a six-month period in which a person of any age must report alleged childhood
sexual trauma).
88. Id.; see id. (allowing a one-year statute of limitation period within which to file a revived claim).
89. See, e.g., Ernsdorff & Loftus, supra note 5, at 167-72 (positing specific procedural requirements as
solutions to providing the plaintiff an opportunity in court and preserving the traditional protections of a criminal
defendant).
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APPENDIX
Code Section Affected
Penal Code § 803 (amended).
AB 2014 (Boland); 1996 STAT. Ch. 130
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The Confrontation Clause and Evidentiary Admissions
Christine M. Adams
I. INTRODUCTION
Under existing law, evidence of a statement' made other than by a witness, that
is offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted is inadmissible at trial.2 This is
known as the hearsay rule.3 Various exceptions to the hearsay rule allow particular
evidence to be admitted as specified by law.4
The purpose behind exclusion of certain types of hearsay evidence is to ensure
the reliability of testimony by means of the oath, the exposure of the declarant to
cross-examination, and the opportunity for the jury to observe the demeanor of the
declarant at trial.5 The hearsay rule precludes admission in the judicial record of
statements that do not fit an established exception to the hearsay rule and that are not
subject to the rigors of cross-examination.6
Under Chapter 560, evidence of prior inconsistent statements of a witness
properly admitted in a preliminary hearing or trial of the same criminal matter are not
made inadmissible by the hearsay rule, provided the declarant is unavailable?
Additionally, Chapter 560 provides that a party against whom a statement is offered
I. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 1200 (West 1995) (defining "statement" as an oral or written assertion or
nonverbal conduct of a person, if it is intended as an assertion); cf. FED. R. EviD. 802 (same).
2. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1200(b) (West 1995); see id. (stating that except as provided by law, hearsay
evidence is inadmissible); see also FED. R. EvtD. 802 (stating that hearsay is not admissible except as provided by
the federal rules of evidence or other rules prescribed by the Supreme Court).
3. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1200 (West 1995); cf. FED. R. EvD. 802 (enunciating the federal hearsay rule).
4. See CAL. EvID. CODE §§ 1220-1350 (West 1995 & Supp. 1997) (listing the exceptions to the hearsay
rule); see, e.g., id. § 1350 (West 1995) (detailing the circumstances in which evidence of a statement made by a
declarant in a criminal proceeding is not made inadmissible by the hearsay rule, provided the declarant is un-
available at trial); cf. FED. R. EviD. 803(l)-(24) (listing the exceptions applicable regardless of declarant avail-
ability); id 804(b)(l)-(5) (providing for various exceptions where the declarant is unavailable as a witness at trial).
5. FED. R. EVlD. 802 advisory committee's note; see California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 162 (1970)
(explaining that statements made absent oath or affirmation and not offered in the presence of the trier-of-fact are
not sufficiently reliable); People v. Cudjo, 6 Cal. 4th 585, 608, 863 P.2d 635, 649, 25 Cal. Rptr. 390, 404 (1993)
(explaining that hearsay is generally excluded because of the difficulty of testing perception and memory as well
as the inability of the trier-of-fact to observe the demeanor of the witness at trial).
6. See supra note 2 and accompanying text (indicating that hearsay evidence is inadmissible).
7. CAL. EviD. CODE § 1294 (enacted by Chapter 560); see id. § 1294(aX1), (2) (enacted by Chapter 560)
(listing the types of prior inconsistent statements to include videotaped statements and transcripts of prior hearings);
cf. FED. R. EvID. 804 (defining "unavailability" to include a declarant who persists in refusing to testify concerning
the subject matter of the statement, testifies to a lack of memory regarding the subject matter of the statement, or
is unable to be present and testify because of death).
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may examine or cross-examine any person who testified at the earlier proceeding re-
garding the prior inconsistent statement of the witness who is now unavailable.8
Chapter 560 seeks to rectify a common problem in criminal proceedings in-
volving gang-related violence Often, a key witness for the prosecution recants or
denies earlier inculpating statements or, at trial, hides or is otherwise unavailable.' 0
Accordingly, the Los Angeles District Attorney, as sponsor of the bill, noted the
reliance of the prosecution's bar on former testimony." Chapter 560 is opposed by
California Attorneys for Criminal Justice who stated that the admission of such
evidence is a violation of the accused's right of confrontation.' 2
In addition to Chapter 560, Chapter 416 also affects the admissibility of hearsay
evidence at trial.'3 Chapter 416 would allow the admission of evidence of a statement
made by an unavailable declarant against a party when that evidence relates to the
infliction or threat of infliction of physical harm.t4 Under specified circumstances,
Chapter 416 would exempt prior statements from exclusion under the hearsay rule.'5
Unlike Chapt& 560, admissibility of statements under Chapter 416 does not depend
on their prior admission in the record of a prior judicial or preliminary hearing.' 6
Chapter 416 would permit the admission of various statements by a victim in
evidence, which may include personal diaries.'7 The admission of such statements
is intended to reflect the perception of the victim in the judicial record.' 8 The author
8. See CAl.. EvrD. CODE § 1294(b) (enacted by Chapter 560) (providing for the right to examine or cross-
examine any person who testified at the preliminary hearing or proceeding regarding the statement of the
unavailable witness).
9. ASSEMBLY FLOOR, CoMMrmANALYSiS OF AB 2483, at 2-3 (May 30,1996).
10. Id.at3.
11. Id.
12. Id.; see id. (detailing the opposition's premise that the admission of such evidence violates the right to
confront a witness against him or her as provided in the Sixth Amendment).
13. See infra notes 14-15 and accompanying text (discussing Chapter 416 and the exception from the
hearsay bar of prior statements).
14. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 1370(a) (enacted by Chapter 416) (stating the conditions to be met before a
request for the admission of the statement as evidence is made).
15. See id. § 1370 (a)(1)-(3) (enacted by Chapter 416) (providing that evidence of a statement by an
unavailable declarant is not made inadmissible by the hearsay rule if the statement purports to narrate, describe, or
explain an act, condition, or event purportedly perceived by the declarant where that act, condition, or event is past,
present, or future infliction of physical abuse).
16. Compare id. § 1370 (b)(1) (enacted by Chapter 416) (allowing admission if the statement was made in
contemplation of trial) with id. § 1294 (enacted by Chapter 560) (permitting prior statements to be admitted in a
judicial proceeding or preliminary hearing).
17. Id. § 1370 (enacted by Chapter 416); see Id. § 1370 (a)(l)-(3) (enacted by Chapter 416) (providing no
bar to the admissibility of personal statements); see also David Kline. Measure to Ease Rules on Hearsay Evidence
Clears Assembly Committee, METROPOLITAN NEws ENTERPRIsES (New York), July 5. 1996, at 5 (supplying
examples of various personal statements, including written or electronic diary entries).
18. See ASSEMBLY JUDICIARY CoMMrrr- CoMMInriE ANALYSIs oF AB 2068, at 2-3 (Apr. 22, 1996)
(summarizing the intent of AB 2068 to provide the trier of fact with a more comprehensive understanding of the
situation from the victim's point of view); see also Pamela Martineau, Assembly Approves Bill to Broaden Hearsay
Exceptions, METROPOLrrAN NEWs ENTERPRISES (New York). May 7, 1996, at 8 (noting the support of various
Assemblymembers who favor providing the trier of fact with a comprehensive record regarding the situation
810
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of Chapter 416 feels that the inclusion of such statements is reasonable where a
defendant admits to charges of physical abuse because such admission lends
credibility to the declarant's assertion.19 Chapter 416, however, does not require the
defendant's admission before a request to admit the prior statement as evidence can
be made.20
Chapter 416 is opposed by California Attorneys for Criminal Justice.21 They feel
that if such evidence is admitted, it is possible for a jury to convict a defendant in
order to punish him for prior wrong acts, disregarding the need for sufficient
evidence to convict him for the crime actually chargede
II. ANALYSIS OF CHAPTERS 416 AND 560
Notwithstanding the noted support and opposition for Chapter 416 and Chapter
560, significant constitutional issues must be addressed. The Sixth Amendment
guarantees that in all criminal proceedings, the accused has the right to confront the
witnesses that provide evidence at trial.23 Accordingly, the Supreme Court has had
several occasions to rule on the requirements of that constitutional guarantee as it
relates to the introduction of evidence at trial 4
A. Sixth Amendment Implications
In Pointer v. Texas,25 the Court noted that the defendant's right to confront wit-
nesses, as part of the adversarial process, was a fundamental right under the Sixth
Amendment.26 The relationship between the Confrontation Clause and the admis-
sibility of evidence has been the subject of rigorous debate among legal scholars. 7
surrounding the accused and the alleged victim).
19. ASSEMBLYJUDICIARYCOMMrrrEE, COMMrrFEE ANALYSIS OFAB 2068, at 11-12 (Apr. 22, 1996); see
id. (stating that the defendant's admission gives the victim's statement sufficient trustworthiness to be admitted at
trial).
20. See CAL. EVtD. CODE § 1294 (enacted by Chapter 416).
21. ASSEMBLYJUDICIARY COMMrrEE, COMMrFEE ANALYSIS OF AB 2068, at 12 (Apr. 22, 1996).
22. Id.; see id. (stating that to allow juries to hear such evidence would be unduly prejudicial to the
defendant and could result in a verdict based on unsubstantiated and incomplete information).
23. U.S. CONST. amend VI; see CAL. CONST. art. I, § 15 (incorporating the Sixth Amendment into the
California Constitution).
24. See infra notes 29,36,39,41,55 and accompanying text.
25. 380 U.S. 400 (1965).
26. Pointer, 380 U.S. at 403-06.
27. See, e.g., Randolph N. Jonakait, Restoring the Confrontation Clause to the Sixth Amendment, 35 UCLA
L. REV. 557 (1988); Laird C. Kirkpatrick, Confrontation and Hearsay, 70 MINN. L. REV. 665 (1986); Graham C.
Lilly, Notes on the Confrontation Clause and Ohio v. Roberts, 36 U. FLA. L. REv. 207 (1984); Nancy H. Baughan,
Note, White v. Illinois: The Confrontation Clause and the Supreme Court's Preference for Out-of-Court State-
ments, 46 VAND. L. REV. 235 (1993); Patrice L. Harris, Note, Confrontation Clause, 28 HoW. LJ. 171 (1985).
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In California v. Green,2 the Court noted the two popular views for the admission
of prior statements of an unavailable witness at trial.29 The'Court did not label one
view better than the other but clearly stated that, regardless of the view taken, any
change in the law of evidence would have to comport with the Sixth Amendment.30
The Court ultimately held that when a declarant is a witness at trial and subject to
cross-examination, the dangers of admitting the prior statement are absent and no
violation of the Sixth Amendment exists.3? ' According to the Green Court, the pro-
tections afforded under the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment, as they
relate to an available witnesses at trial, are not violated by admitting prior state-
ments.32 The principles behind the Confrontation Clause as it relates to the exclusion
of the prior out-of-court statements are generally noted to include concern that: (1)
The prior statement may not have been made under oath; (2) the declarant may not
have been subject to cross-examination; and (3) the jury is unable to observe and
judge the declarant at the time the statement is made?3
A decade later, in Ohio v. Roberts,34 the Court revisited the relationship between
the Confrontation Clause and the admission of hearsay evidence.35 The Court
explained that the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment restricted the
admission of evidence in two ways. First, necessity must be proven, and second, the
statement must either possess a guarantee of trustworthiness or be proven reliable
before admission.36 In addition, in holding that an available declarant's prior state-
ment is admissible, the Court implies that an unavailable declarant's admission may
28. 399 U.S. 149 (1970).
29. Green, 399 U.S. at 154-55 (stating that the traditional view is that out-of-court statements are
inadmissible and may not be offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted, while the minority view would permit
the substantive use of prior inconsistent statements). See generally FED. R. EviD. 801(d)(1)(a) (allowing for the
substantive use of prior inconsistent statements as an exception to the hearsay rule); Stanley A. Goldman, Guilt by
Intuition: 7he Insufficiency of Prior Inconsistent Statements to Convict, 65 N.C. L. REV. 1, app. at §§ I-II (1986)
(detailing the extent to which various states have adopted Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(l)(a) and noting any
modification thereof).
30. See Green, 399 U.S. at 156 (stating that the creation of new exceptions for the admission of evidence
over the hearsay rule will often raise constitutional questions regarding the right of confrontation).
31. Id. at 153-58.
32. See id. at 158-61 (concluding that the available witness is subject to being called to testify and, if callcd,
would be subject to examination in full view of the jury and that these factors sufficiently protect the accused's right
to confrontation at trial).
33. See id. at 158 (discussing the theory behind the hearsay rule and the exclusion of out-of-court statenvents
at trial); see also Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56,71 (citing Daniel Davenport, 7he Confrontation Clause and the Co.
Conspirator Exception in Criminal Prosecutions, 85 HARv. L. REv. 1378 (1972) as declaring that the purpose
behind cross-examination is to challenge the honesty, perception, and memory of the declarant in view of the jury).
34. 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
35. See infra notes 36-37 and accompanying text. See generally Lilly, supra note 27, at 207 (analyzing the
Ohio v. Roberts decision and the Confrontation Clause extensively).
36. See Roberts, 448 U.S. at 65-66 (acknowledging the preference for face-to-face accusation, the
requirement of necessity of the statement before disposal of that preference, as well as the purpose of the fact
finding process to determine the accuracy and reliability of the evidence admitted). Additionally, the Court would
require the offered evidence to possess an independent guarantee of trustworthiness to satisfy the "reliability"
requirement when such evidence does not meet an exception to the hearsay rule. Id.
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be improper. Discussing this implication, one legal scholar noted that if every out-of-
court statement must be made by an unavailable declarant, the Roberts test would
have rendered the twenty-four exceptions in Federal Rule of Evidence 803 on
constitutionally-shaky ground.37
Three key United States Supreme Court cases analyzed the constitutional
protections afforded under the Sixth Amendment and the relationship those pro-
visions have with evidentiary admissions. The Supreme Court, in United States v.
Inadi,38 announced that the Roberts decision could not be read so narrowly as to
stand for the proposition that no out-of-court statement can be offered in evidence
unless the unavailability of the declarant is shown.39 The Inadi Court stated that their
decision in Roberts was not intended as a revision of the law of evidence and was not
intended to be so broadly interpreted.4° In addition, the Inadi decision eliminated the
requirement of proving unavailability in certain cases. 4 Later, in Bourjaily v. United
States,42 the Court concluded that the reliability prong of the Roberts test was not
constitutionally mandated by the Sixth Amendment, thereby discarding entirely the
two-prong rule espoused in Roberts.43 Finally, in White v. Illinois," the last decision
of the United States Supreme Court regarding this topic, the Court held that testi-
mony admitted under the medical examination45 and spontaneous declaration6 ex-
ceptions to the hearsay rule do not require the prosecutor to prove the unavailability
of the declarant at trial.47
B. The Current State of the Confrontation Guarantee
The White decision left open the question whether other existing exceptions to
the hearsay rule or subsequent changes in the law of evidence would be exempt from
37. See Kirkpatrick, supra note 27, at 689-91 (discussing the nexus between the unavailability requirement
and several exceptions to the hearsay rule); see also FED. R. EViD. 803(l)-(24) (noting that these specified
exceptions do not require unavailability before admission of the statement at trial).
38. 475 U.S. 387 (1986).
39. Inadi, 475 U.S. at 392-94.
40. Id. at 392.
41. See id. at 399-400 (holding that in conspiracy cases the principles of the unavailability requirement do
not apply); see also CAL. EVID. CODE § 1223 (West 1995) (allowing the admission of coconspirator statements
offered against a party as specified).
42. 483 U.S. 171 (1987).
43. Bourjaily, 483 U.S. at 182 (concluding that, just as unavailability need not be proven before admission
of a prior statement in evidence, reliability is also not mandated by the Constitution).
44. 502 U.S. 346 (1992).
45. See FED. R. EVID. 803(4) (describing the exception for statements given for the purpose of medical
diagnosis or treatment).
46. See id. 803(2) (providing that a statement relating to a startling event or condition made while the
declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by that event or condition is an exception to the hearsay rule);
see also CAL. EVID. CODE § 1240(b) (West 1995) (providing that evidence of a statement made under stress of
excitement is not made inadmissible by the hearsay rule as specified).
47. White, 502 U.S. at 357.
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proving the unavailability of the declarant at trial before admission of prior state-
ments in evidence. The Court stated generally that the decision in Inadi rules out a
strict reading of the Roberts decision. 8 Therefore, it could be true that existing or
new exceptions to the hearsay rule would be exempt from proving the unavailability
of the declarant at trial. In addition, the Court has never provided a definition of the
"particularized guarantees of trustworthiness" discussed in Roberts that, if possessed
by the evidence sought to be admitted, would exempt it from the unavailability re-
quirement.49 This unexplained phrase also provides room for the liberalization of the
hearsay rule and could allow for the admission of a wider range of hearsay evidence
in the future.
Since the Court has moved away from its previous strict interpretation of the
Sixth Amendment as previously interpreted by the Court, it is likely that Chapter 560
will be upheld as constitutional. Chapter 560 retains the requirement of former testi-
mony properly admitted at a prior judicial proceeding.t Thus, the statement would
have been subject to cross-examination, satisfying the right of the accused to con-
front witnesses against him. 51
Chapter 416, however, does not expressly require admission in a prior pro-
ceeding. Chapter 416 allows personal diaries and other statements offered by the
declarant into evidence if the circumstances surrounding the statement indicate its
trustworthiness.52 Chapter 416 is likely to pose serious constitutional issues under the
Sixth Amendment's guarantee of the right of confrontation. Chapter 416 does not
seem to possess an overwhelming reason to dispense with the right of the accused to
confront the witness at trial and may be considered an abridgement of the Con-
stitution.53 In addition, because there is no express requirement that the defendant
corroborate the statement sought to be admitted or that the statement be subjected to
prior cross-examination, and the declarant is not available for his demeanor to be
judged, Chapter 416 could violate the Confrontation Clause. If however, Chapter
416 were found to provide circumstances that meet the particular guarantee of trust-
48. White, 399 U.S. at 357; see United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387,392 (1986) (restricting the application
of the Roberts holding).
49. See Jonakait, supra note 27, at 557 n.56 (discussing the Court's failure to explain what is necessary to
satisfy the guarantee of trustworthiness required under Roberts, and suggesting that the term could be satisfied
under circumstances provided for in the "catch-all" provision of Federal Rule of Evidence 803(24) and 804(b)(5));
see also Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66 (stating that where evidence does not fall within an exception to the hearsay rule,
it must be excluded absent a showing of particularized guarantees of trustworthiness).
50. See CAL. EvID. CODE § 1292(a) (enacted by Chapter 560).
51. See supra note 23 and accompanying text (setting forth the constitutional right to confrontation).
52. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1370 (enacted by Chapter 416).
53. See People v. Horn, 225 Cal. App. 2d 1, 4,36 Cal. Rptr. 898,900 (1964) (requiring that the prosecution
point to a statute that authorizes the impairment of the accused's right of confrontation and must bring the admission
clearly within the statute's guidelines); see also People v. Volk, 221 Cal. App. 2d 291,296, 34 Cal. Rptr. 351, 353
(1963) (stating that a court should zealously protect the right of the defendant to confront witnesses).
54. See spra notes 29, 31-37 and accompanying text (detailing the various judicial requirements necessary
to uphold the admission of hearsay under the Confrontation Clause).
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worthiness mentioned in Roberts,55 it could pass constitutional muster. Therefore, the
introduction of evidence pursuant to Chapter 416 may provide a test case to procure
a more definite statement from the United States Supreme Court regarding what is
required under that portion of the Roberts decision.
California, among other states, has adopted a right of confrontation guarantee
similar to that of the Federal Constitution. 6 California courts have had occasion to
rule on the constitutionality of admission of hearsay evidence, thereby giving
meaning to that guarantee.57 For example, courts have held that when an opportunity
for cross-examination existed in a prior proceeding, the constitutional right of
confrontation is not abridged upon admission of a prior statement.58 A declarant
would not be required to repeat his prior testimony in front of the accused.59
Additionally, California courts have held that the requirement of confrontation does
not preclude the admission of evidence which fits within a hearsay exception. 6°When
former testimony is sought to be admitted, 1 the prior opportunity of the defendant
to cross-examine the witness is sufficient to satisfy the federal right of con-
frontation.62 In People v. Johnson,63 a California court established that preliminary
hearing testimony of a witness is admissible in certain circumstances. 64 The court in
55. See Roberts, 448 U.S. at 65-66 (discussing how the established hearsay rule exceptions satisfy the
reliability requirement and when the evidence cannot be brought within an exception, other guarantees of
trustworthiness would be required). The Court, however, does not elaborate on what these particular guarantees
might include.
56. See CAL. CONST. art. I, § 15 (providing for the right of confrontation in all criminal proceedings); cf
CONN. CONST. art. I, § 8 (stating that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions the accused shall have a right to ... be
confronted with the witnesses against him"); MD. CONST. art. 21 (stating that "in all criminal proceedings, every
man hath a right... to be confronted with the witnesses against him"); N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6 (providing that "[i]n
any trial in any court whatever the party accused shall be... confronted with the witnesses against him").
57. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
58. See, e.g., People v. Bynum, 4 Cal. 3d 589,483 P.2d 1193,94 Cal. Rptr. 241 (1971).
59. Id. at 589, 603,483 P.2d at 1200,94 Cal. Rptr. at 248 (citing California v. Green as establishing that
admission of a statement given under circumstances approximating a trial does not violate the confrontation clause);
see also People v. Noorlander, 76 Cal. App. 2d 274, 274, 172 P.2d 766, 766 (1946) (holding that there is no
constitutional requirement of in-court repetition of prior testimony when that prior testimony was stipulated to and
defendant waived his right to ajury trial).
60. See, e.g., People v. Salas, 58 Cal. App. 3d 460,467, 129 Cal. Rptr. 871, 875 (1976) (holding statements
within a recognized exception constitutionally admissible at trial); see also People v. Hermes, 73 Cal. App. 947,
955, 168 P.2d 44, 48 (1946) (same).
61. See CAL. ErW. CODE § 1235 (West 1995) (providing for the admissibility of prior inconsistent
statements at an earlier judicial proceeding or preliminary hearing); cf. DEt.. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 3507 (1995)
(providing that in a criminal prosecution, the voluntary out-of-court statement of a witness who is present and
subject to cross-examination may be used substantively at trial); 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/115-10.1 (West
1992) (detailing the requirements for the admissibility of prior inconsistent statements at trial); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 8C-1(b)(1) (1995) (providing for admission of prior testimony in civil actions).
62. People v. Green, 3 Cal. 3d 981,990,479 P.2d 998, 1004, 92 Cal. Rptr. 494,500(1970).
63. 39 Cal. App. 3d 749, 114 Cal. Rptr. 545 (1974).
64. See Johnson, 39 Cal. App. 3d at 751, 114 Cal. Rptr. at 550 (establishing that if the witness was cross-
examined at the hearing, the testimony is necessary to the trial, and the prosecution has made a good faith effort
to secure the witness for trial, the prior testimony is constitutionally admissible).
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People v. Salas,65 interpreted the relationship between California's constitutional
guarantee of confrontation and the law of evidence relating to the admissibility of
former testimony.6 The Salas court held that the exception under California Evi-
dence Code § 1235 is valid and is not subject to constitutional attack.67
For the reasons outlined above, Chapter 560 will likely be upheld under both the
United States and California Constitutions. Most likely, however, Chapter 416 will
face difficulty under both federal and state constitutions. Unless other means of
guaranteeing the reliability of statements offered into evidence under Chapter 416 are
adopted, it is likely that Chapter 416 will not successfully meet a constitutional
challenge.
To confront and cross-examine witnesses testifying against the accused is a
fundamental right that has been protected by the courts.6 The line of cases discussed
above caution the legislature that any change in the California Evidence Code
regarding the admissibility of hearsay must be ready for challenge under the Sixth
Amendment.69 Chapter 560 seems likely to meet that challenge while Chapter 416
may have to rely on a yet undetermined standard for admissibility under the
"particularized guarantees of trustworthiness" mentioned in the Roberts decision.0
Ill. TOWARD A CoHESIVE BusINEss RECORDS EXCEPTION
In addition to Chapter 416 and Chapter 560, the legislature further amended the
California Evidence Code with Chapter 146. Chapter 146 changes the requirements
of an affidavit produced in response to a subpoena duces tecum.71 Chapter 146 brings
California Evidence Code § 1561 and § 1562 in line with § 1271 which provides for
the introduction of specified business records.7
While business records are considered hearsay of the act, event, or conditions
they describe, an exception exists whereby they may be admitted in evidence. 73 The
trustworthiness of various business records is presumed to meet the reliability
65. 58 Cal. App. 3d 460, 129 Cal. Rptr. 871 (1976).
66. See Salas, 58 Cal. App. 3d at 467, 129 Cal. Rptr at 876.
67. Id.
68. See, e.g., Volk, 221 Cal. App. 2d at 296, 34 Cal. Rptr. at 353 (declaring that one of the fundamental
rights of an accused is to confront witnesses during trial).
69. See supra notes 29-48 and accompanying text.
70. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
71. CAL. EviD. CODE §§ 1561, 1562 (amended by Chapter 146); see id. § 1561(a)(1)-(5) (amended by
Chapter 146) (requiring the affidavit to state that the affiant is the custodian of the records or an otherwise qualified
witness, that the copy contained is a true copy, that the records were prepared in the ordinary course of business,
the identity of the records and a description of their method of preparation); id. § 1562 (amended by Chapter 146)
(stating, inter alia, that the affidavit produced pursuant to § 1561 is admissible as evidence of the method of
production of the records subpoenaed).
72. See id. § 1271 (West 1997) (listing the requirements for the introduction of business records as an
exception to the hearsay rule).
73. Id.
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requirement enunciated in Roberts; the documents are largely relied on in com-
mercial endeavors and are part of regular business operations. 74 These facts combine
to render the documents presumably reliable.
Chapter 146 allegedly corrects a technical difficulty left after the 1989 amend-
ment of California Evidence Code § 1271.75 When § 1271 was amended, the require-
ments for admissibility of business records were changed.76 Unfortunately, other
sections of the California Evidence Code, namely § 1561 and § 1562, that were
impacted by § 1271, were not amended. In sum, these sections describe the general
procedure for production of business records, including the requirement that an
affidavit describe the manner in which the requested documents were compiled!7
However, the sections do not contain provisions that ensure the reliability or trust-
worthiness of the documents sought to be introduced. Therefore, a business record
could meet all of the requirements of § 1561 and § 1562 of the California Evidence
Code but fall to meet the more stringent requirements of § 1271. This was precisely
the case in Taggart v. Super Seer Corporation.8
In Taggart, the court illustrated the inadequacy of § 1561 of the California
Evidence Code in a holding that found a report sought to be introduced into evidence
to be inadmissible hearsay. 9 Since the report contained no evidence of how the
business records were prepared or where the source of the information contained
therein could be found, the record lacked the trustworthiness required to admit the
business record under an exception to the hearsay rule.8° By enacting Chapter 146,
the legislature has effectively incorporated the requirements of California Evidence
Code § 1271 into § 1561 and § 1562, thus eliminating the need for subsequent testi-
74. As a recognized exception to the hearsay rule, business records would satisfy the reliability prong of
the Roberts test. See Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980); see also Glen Weissenberger, Hearsay: Business
Records and Public Records, 51 U. CIN. L. REV. 42, 46-47 (1982) (discussing the rationale for the business record
exception); supra note 36 and accompanying text (detailing the requirement of reliability before the admission of
such evidence).
75. See SENATE JUDIcIARY COMMrrTEE, COMMrrEE ANALYSIS OF AB 3001, at I (June 18, 1996)
(summarizing the promulgation of AB 3001 to correct the technical difficulty present, namely, that an otherwise
acceptable affidavit fails to meet the requirements of CAL. EVID. CODE § 1271); see also 1989 Cal. Stat. ch. 1416,
sec. 31, at 2 (amending CAL. EVID. CODE § 1271).
76. See Taggart v. Super Seer Corp., 33 Cal. App. 4th 1697, 1707,40 Cal. Rptr. 2d 56, 62 (1995) (noting
the 1989 amendment to California Evidence Code § 1562 and the implication that admission of a copy of business
records under § 1562 is dependent upon conformity with California Evidence Code § 1271).
77. See CAL. EVID. CODE §§ 1561, 1562 (amended by Chapter 146) (describing the affidavit that must
accompany busihess records, and the admissibility of (1) the affidavit and (2) copies of the requested records).
78. See Taggart, 33 Cal. App. 4th at 1706,40 Cal. Rptr. at 61 (noting the failure of an affidavit to provide
a foundation for admissibility under California Evidence Code § 1271 despite conformity with § 1561).
79. See id. at 1706-08, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 61-62 (explaining that an affidavit satisfying only California
Evidence Code § 1561 was not proven to be reliable, and that this inadequacy rendered the affidavit inadmissible
as evidence).
80. See id at1706,40 Cal. Rptr. at 61.
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mony regarding the identity, preparation, and source of the information contained in
such records. 1
The foregoing analysis of the business records exception reveals that the
modification of California Evidence Code § 1561 and § 1562 poses no constitutional
difficulty. The reliability prong of the Roberts decision is arguably satisfied by the
requirements of admission under § 1561 and § 1562. The admission of the required
affidavit is unlikely to infringe upon the accused's constitutional right to confront
witnesses.
IV. CONCLUSION
When society, through the legislature, seeks to curtail any perceived advantage
an accused possesses at trial, constitutional issues loom large. While the accused in
a criminal trial is afforded extensive protection against unconstitutional evidentiary
admissions, Chapters 416, 560, and 146 reveal that when permissible, those pro-
tections may be narrowed. It remains to be seen if these carefully drafted changes in
the California Evidence Code will result in any state or federal constitutional chal-
lenges. The foregoing commentary demonstrates the author's belief that Chapters
560 and 146 pose no violation of the Sixth Amendment. Chapter 416, however,
would have been on more solid constitutional ground if reliability requirements were
incorporated into its provisions.
APPENDIX
Code Sections Affected
Evidence Code § 1294 (new).
AB 2068 (Richter); 1996 STAT. Ch. 416
Evidence Code § 1370 (new).
AB 2483 (Firestone); 1996 STAT. Ch. 560
Evidence Code §§ 1561, 1562 (amended).
AB 3001 (Napolitano); 1996 STAT. Ch. 146
81. See CAL. EVID. CODE §§ 1561, 1562 (amended by Chapter 146) (adding the additional requirements of
identification of the records and the method such records are produced to the general requirements for the
production of business records); see also SENATE JUDICIARY COMMTEE, COMMrEE ANALYSIS OF AB 3001, at
1 (June 18. 1996) (containing the proponent's opinion that such an elimination of required testimony is both cost
effective and time saving).
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Efforts Made to Increase the Use of Mediation
Julie Momjian
I. INTRODUCn'ION
Overcrowded court dockets and the increased costs of courtroom litigation' have
forced state courts and legislatures to develop alternative methods of dispute
resolution.2 These methods encourage the resolution of disputes among parties before
any unnecessary time or money is expended. Mediation has been the method which
has generated the greatest enthusiasm in the legal field.4 Mediation initiates a form
of dispute resolution that involves the intervention of a neutral third party whose sole
purpose is to facilitate negotiation between the disputants.5 A great advantage of
mediation, and one that sets it aside from other methods of dispute resolution such
as arbitration, focuses on the nonbinding nature of the process.6 The mediator,
through the entire mediation process, has no authority to impose a decision on the
participants, although the mediator can assist the parties in finding a way to
communicate and eventually reach an agreement that is satisfactory to both sides.7
Most parties that turn to mediators in lieu of judges or juries tend to successfully
resolve their disputes! A survey carried out by the Center for Public Resources
Institute for Dispute Resolution reveals that the success rate of private, voluntary
mediation is eighty-one percent.9 Further, mediation fosters positive feelings between
1. See Charles L. Linder, With the Courts Crowded, Private Justice for the Rich and Famous, L.A. TIMES,
Dec. 25, 1995, at M6 (reporting that the average civil case takes 20 months to get to trial).
2. James M. Assey, Jr., Mum's the Word on Mediation: Confidentiality and Synder-Falkinham v.
Stockburger, 9 GEO. J. LEGAL EThiCS 991,991 (1996).
3. Campbell C. Hutchinson, The Case for Mandatory Mediation, 42 LOY. L. REV. 85, 86 (1996); see id.
at 85 (remarking that a better means of resolving disputes must be established because of the fact that litigation has
become too "expensive, time consuming, combative, protracted, and destructive of relationships").
4. Yaroslav Sochynsky, Alternative Dispute Resolution: How to Use It to Your Advantage, CAI3 ALI-
ABA 397, 399 (1996); see CAL. CIV. PRO. CODE § 1775 (West Supp. 1997) (declaring that alternative dispute
resolution in a fair, timely, appropriate, and cost-effective manner is an essential function of the judicial branch and
that mediation in particular should be encouraged as a method of alternative dispute resolution).
5. Hutchinson, supra note 3, at 86.
6. Id; see Bradford W. Wyche, Comment, Mediation: Changing the Way We Think About Disputes, S.C.
LAW., May/June 1996, at 27 (stating that an arbitrator makes the decision for the parties while a mediator has no
authority to impose a binding decision).
7. Assey, supra note 2, at 992; see id. (stating that the mediator, unlike ajudge, identifies issues, uncovers
causes of conflict, and helps explore the consequences of not settling).
8. Wyche, supra note 6, at 27.
9. Id.; see id. (reporting that according to the Center for Public Resources Institute for Dispute Resolution,
the success rate for mediations mandated by the court is 64%); see also Lester J. Levy, ConsiderAlternatives Before
Filing Suit, S.F. CHRON., Mar. 21, 1994, at A19 (emphasizing that studies indicate that companies experience a
better than 80% success rate when they attempt to resolve their disputes through mediation).
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the disputing parties."' When the mediation results in a mutual agreement by the
parties, both sides leave the mediation with a positive sentiment about the entire pro-
cess and outcome; whereas if the parties had gone to court, one side would
inevitably leave the courthouse with feelings of bitterness toward the outcome.12
Thus, mediation provides parties with a healthy way to resolve a dispute which will
ultimately save the potential litigant time, money, and energy, while at the same time
preserving the relationship between the parties. 3
II. THE IMPORTANCE OF CONFIDENTIALITY
Because mediation sessions are primarily aimed at helping parties come to an
agreement, for mediation to work, the process must be such that it places the parties
at ease, thereby facilitating the use of compromise by both sides. 4 Compromise
requires parties to admit deep feelings involved in some issues and often make
admissions of facts that they would normally not concede.' 5 Thus, in order to
engender openness among the parties, it is essential that statements made during a
mediation session be kept confidential.'6 Confidentiality assures a disputant that
statements made during a mediation session can in no way harm the disputant in the
future if mediation fails.' 7 Moreover, ensuring confidentiality encourages the use of
mediation by guaranteeing that a party will not jeopardize his or her potential suit in
10. Sochynsky, supra note 4, at 402.
11. Id.; see id. (remarking that when mediation does work, parties leave with a good feeling about the
outcome, and may even leave as business partners or friends).
12. See id. at 401 (contrasting mediation to a settlement conference in which the judge tells the parties what
a fair settlement would be, whereas mediation helps the parties find their way to an agreement that is satisfactory
to both sides).
13. Hutchinson, supra note 3, at 88; see id. (stating that a successful mediation will result in substantial
savings to the parties by eliminating trial and appeal expenses, and reducing discovery expenses); see also Levy,
supra note 9, at A19 (stating that companies that have used mediation have saved up to 75% over previous litigation
costs).
14. Lawrence R. Freedman & Michael L. Prigoff, Confidentiality in Mediation, 2 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP.
RESOL. 37, 38 (1986); see id. (stating that effective mediation requires candor).
15. l
16. Id.
17. See Assey, supra note 2, at 992. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals stated the following proposition:
If participants cannot rely on the confidential treatment of everything that transpires during these
[mediation] sessions then counsel of necessity will feel constrained to conduct themselves in a cautious,
tight-lipped, non-committal manner more suitable to poker players in a high-stakes game than to
adversaries attempting to arrive at ajust resolution of a civil dispute.
Lake Utopia Paper, Ltd. v. Connelly Containers. Inc., 608 F.2d 928, 930 (2d Cir. 1979) (per curiam). But see
Regents of the Univ. v. Sumner, 42 Cal. App. 4th 1209, 1213, 50 Cal. Rptr. 2d 200, 202 (1996) (holding that oral
statements that define the scope of the settlement agreement reached after mediation are admissible to enforce the
settlement since § 1152.5 of the Califomia Evidence Code only protects statements made during the course of
mediation, not oral agreements made after the mediation is over).
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the future by making statements during the mediation process which might be
detrimental to the case. 8
Although there are several ways to protect statements made during mediation
from becoming admissible as evidence, these methods often do .not afford parties
who have undergone mediation heightened protection. 9 Thus, many states have
enacted specific provisions which ensure the confidentiality of statements made
during mediation sessions.20 California law provides disputants assurance that state-
ments made during the course of mediation are not admissible as evidence nor
subject to discovery.2' Although the confidentiality provision provides parties with
protection of those statements made during the mediation process, the provision, by
itself, leaves open a gap with respect to statements made prior to the mediation
process.22
The selection of the mediator is ultimately in the hands of the disputing parties. 23
Selecting the appropriate mediator to assist in the resolution of a dispute is of utmost
importance because the mediator may potentially impair the chances of a fair
resolution.24 To test the qualifications and qualities of the mediator, either side may
want to ask the potential mediator questions about certain aspects of the case to deter-
18. Freedman & Prigoff, supra note 14, at 38; see Ryan v. Garcia, 27 Cal. App. 4th 1006, 1010,33 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 158, 160-61 (1994) (recognizing that the public policy underlying § 1152.5 of the California Evidence
Code, which ensures confidentiality, is the promotion of mediation as a preferable alternative to judicial resolution
of disputes).
19. Freedman & Prigoff, supra note 14, at 40; see id (explaining that evidentiary exclusions under Federal
Rule of Evidence 408, discovery limitations under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26, and agreements of
confidentiality are among the ways in which parties could contest the admissibility of statements made during
mediation); id. (contending that the above referenced provisions fail to afford these parties adequate protection).
20. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 44.201(5) (West 1988 & Supp. 1997) (asserting that any information related
to the dispute obtained from files, reports, case summaries, mediator notes, or other communications is confidential
and cannot be disclosed unless there is written consent by all parties to the suit); IND. CODE ANN. § 4-21.5-3.5-18
(West Supp. 1996) (stating that an attorney must submit to the mediator confidential statements of the proceeding
before the mediation conference, which shall remain privileged and confidential unless there is an agreement by
the parties to the contrary); OR. REV. STAT. § 36.205 (West Supp. 1997) (proclaiming that communications made
in connection with the mediation, whether made to the mediator, or to a party, or to any other person, if made at
the mediation session, shall remain confidential); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-576.10 (Michie Supp. 1996) (stating that
all memoranda, work products, or other materials which are in the case file of a dispute resolution program will be
confidential).
21. CAL EviD. CODE § 1152.5(aX3) (amended by Chapter 174); see id. § 1152(a) (West 1995) (stating that
evidence that a person has offered another a compromise for an injury is inadmissible to prove liability for loss or
damage); CAL. FAM. CODE § 3177 (West 1994) (providing that mediation of custody and visitation issues will be
confidential); CAL. GOV'TCODE § 11420.20 (West Supp. 1997) (requiring the Office of Administrative Hearings
to adopt rules for alternative dispute resolution after July 1, 1997, which shall include confidentiality of mediation
or arbitration proceedings); CAL. LAB. CODE § 65 (West 1989) (establishing that the records of the Department of
Industrial Relations relating to labor disputes are confidential).
22. ASSEMBLY COMMMrEE ON JUDICIARY, COMMrrIEE ANALYSIS OF SB 1522, at 2 (June 26, 1996).
23. See Sochynsky, supra note 4, at 408 (explaining how to select the appropriate mediator).
24. 1L; see id (specifying the attributes that a mediator should possess in order to effectively carry out the
mediation job, including the following- excellent communication and negotiating skills, good active listening skills,
a sense of fairness, a good understanding of human nature and practical psychology, good judgment, and the ability
to analyze complex legal issues quickly).
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mine expertise or sensitivity?8 However, although selection of a suitable mediator
necessitates this type of questioning, prior to the enactment of Chapter 174,
statements made to a prospective mediator during a consultation were both subject
to discovery and admissible during trial.6
Chapter 174 eliminates this problem by making confidential any statements made
during a consultation with a mediator or mediation service for the purpose of
retaining mediation services?7 This provision ensures that parties contemplating
mediation have no reason to avoid utilizing the process.8
However, opponents argue that Chapter 174 leaves itself open to potential
abuse.29 For instance, a party may wrongfully claim that a damaging communication
sought to be admitted by the opposing party is inadmissible because it was madefor
the purpose of hiring the person as a mediator.:- Consequently, opponents have
suggested amending the statute to include a writing as evidence of the consultation.31
Advocates of Chapter 174, on the other hand, assert that a writing would merely
complicate a process that is aimed at minimizing the formality of a court pro-
ceeding.32 Moreover, supporters argue that abuse of the language of the provision
will not be a threat to Chapter 174 because the phrase stating "for the purpose of
hiring that service or mediator ' 33 will most likely be strictly construed by judges
Im. CONCLUSION
Mediation offers disputants an alternative method of dispute resolution which
saves parties time and money, while at the same time minimizing the burdens placed
on the overcrowded court system. Confidentiality, when guaranteed by the legis-
lature, has the potential of encouraging parties to choose mediation as an alternative
method of dispute resolution. 5 Without the assurance of confidentiality, parties may
fear that if the mediation were to fail, statements made before or during the process
25. ld.; see id. at 410 (stating that before a mediator is chosen, time should be taken to learn about the
mediator so that everyone will be comfortable with the selection).
26. ASSEMBLY COMMITrEE ON JUDICIARY, COMMITrEE ANALYSIS OF SB 1522, at 2 (June 26, 1996).
27. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1152.5(a)(3) (amended by Chapter 174).
28. Wilson Signs Measure Designed to Increase Confidentiality of Mediation, CAPrroL Nsws SERVICE
(Sacramento, Cal.), July 18, 1996, at 3; see id. (stating that a representative of the California Dispute Resolution
Council testified that the legislation was needed to avoid having parties refrain from using mediation).
29. David Kline, Panel Approves Bill to Increase Confidentiality of Mediation, CAPITOL NEWs SERVICE
(Sacramento, Cal.), May 15, 1996, at 9.
30. Id.; see id. (stating that any person may claim, after the fact, that a social conversation at a cocktail party
with a person who just happens to practice mediation was a consultation "for the purpose of retaining the mediator
or mediation service").
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. See CAL. EVlD. CODE § 1152.5(a)(3) (amended by Chapter 174).
34. Kline, supra note 29, at 9.
35. Ryan v. Garcia, 27 Cal. App. 4th 1006, 1010,33 Cal. Rptr. 2d 158, 160-61 (1994).
Pacific Law Journal / VoL 28
would be used against them at trial?6 For this reason, disputants may avoid using the
mediation process altogether. Moreover, confidentiality, when offered, must protect
the disputants at every level of the mediation process. Chapter 174 preserves the
confidentiality of mediation before the beginning of the mediation process, thereby
providing disputants with an incentive to resolve their disputes through a mechanism
other than the overcrowded court system.
APPENDIX
Code Section Affected
Evidence Code § 1152.5 (amended).
AB 1522 (Greene); 1996 STAT. Ch. 174
36. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
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Evidence: The Usage of Hypnotically Enhanced Testimony
Against Criminal Defendants
Joshua M. Dickey
I. INTRODUCTION
Opinions vary and misconceptions abound when hypnosis is the topic of
conversation. For many people, hypnosis is no more than a parlor trick in which a
"hypnotist" commands willing "volunteers" to act ridiculously. Others believe that
hypnosis assures the veracity of the spoken word, much like a magic truth serum.
Still, others do not believe in hypnosis at all. Thus, the opinions of lay persons and
hypnosis researchers vary widely on the subject.
No generally accepted definition of hypnosis exists; however, most credible
definitions include the suspension of critical judgment and the existence of extreme
suggestibility.' Because of varying definitions and opinions, controversy surrounds
the use of hypnosis in criminal trials.
II. POST-HYPNOTIC TESTIMONY: ADMISSIBILITY PROBLEMS AND
JURISDICTIONAL SOLUTIONS
A. Investigatory Usage
Police departments often use hypnosis as an investigatory tool The ability of
hypnosis to unlock blocked memories allows police to gain information otherwise
seemingly beyond their reach.3 Although some of the testimony gained from a
hypnotized witness may be inaccurate,4 the inaccuracies generally do not prejudice
the defendant because the police only use the testimony to track down other
1. Robert S. Spector & Teree E. Foster, Admissibility of Hypnotic Statements: Is the Lan, of Evidence
Susceptible?, 38 OtIo ST. LJ. 567,570(1977); see id. (defining "hypnosis" as an alteration in consciousnes and
concentration, in which the subject manifests a heightened degree of suggestibility, while awareness is maintained);
see also Gary A. Shaw, The Admissibility of Hypnotically Enhanced Testimony in Criminal Trials, 75 MARQ. L.
REV. 1. 1 (1991) (stating that nobody knows exactly what hypnosis is); Lisa K Rozzano, Comment, The Use of
Hypnosis in Criminal Trials: The Black Letter of the Black Art, 21 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 635, 639 (1988)
(characterizing hypnosis as a state akin to sleep wherein an individual can exclude peripheral stimuli and intensely
focus on a topic).
2. Rozzano, supra note 1, at 637.
3. See id. (stating that the increased potential for remembering events often leads to reliable independent
physical evidence). Buisee Shaw, supra note 1. at 13-14 (suggesting that hypnosis may only result in success on
a small number of occasions because much of the information gained from a hypnotized witness is inaccurate).
4. Shaw, supra note 1, at 15; see infra Part lI.B. (describing factors contributing to the inaccuracy and
unreliability of hypnotically enhanced testimony).
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evidence5 Rather, the inaccuracies merely result in wasted resources used in
following false leads.6
However, post-hypnotic testimony (testimony obtained after the witness under-
went hypnosis) may prejudice a defendant when used against the defendant as
evidence.7 Accuracy of evidence is essential when a person's freedom hangs in the
balance. A jury bases its decision upon the evidence presented; inaccurate evidence
poses the danger of leading to an otherwise undeserved conviction! Several factors
contribute to the inaccuracy and unreliability of post-hypnotic testimony making it
particularly dangerous as evidence?
B. Evidentiary Usage
Three main problems render post-hypnotic testimony unreliable. Those problems
are hyper suggestibility, confabulation, and memory hardening.10
1. Hyper Suggestibility
Hypnosis renders a person extremely susceptible to suggestion." In fact, some
people argue that suggestion is the "keystone of hypnosis."' 2 For example, a
hypnotist could suggest to the witness that the color of the defendant's jacket was
brown when, in fact, the witness did not know the color of the defendant's jacket. 3
Suggestions may be transmitted both intentionally and unintentionally. 4 Moreover,
even relatively minor details have proven to influence the subject of hypnosis. 5
5. See Shaw, supra note 1, at 15 (stating that no negative impact results from the inaccuracies).
6. Id.
7. See Rozzano, supra note 1, at 638 (expressing concern that unreliable post-hypnotic testimony may
result in a wrongful conviction).
8. See id. (observing that inaccuracies in testimony may lead to a conviction based upon unreliable
evidence).
9. See Shaw, supra note 1, at 8 (listing hyper suggestibility, confabulation, and memory hardening as
factors that render post-hypnotic testimony inaccurate); see also Rozzano, supra note 1, at 639 (listing the same
factors).
10. Shaw, supra note 1, at 8; see Rozzano, supra note 1, at 639 (listing the same general problems, although
memory hardening is termed overconfidence).
11. Rozzano, supra note 1, at 639; see WEBSTER'SNEWINTERNATIONALDICTIONARY2286 (3d ed. 1971)
(defining "suggestion" as the "inducing of an idea that is accepted or acted on readily and uncritically, as in
hypnosis" or "the idea induced or the stimulus used to induce it").
12. Shaw, supra note I, at 8.
13. See id (asserting that a hypnotist could place memories in a witness's mind that do not match the reality
of what the witness actually perceived).
14. Id. at 8-9.
15. See Rozzano, supra note 1, at 639-40 (stating that factors such as the hypnotist's clothes, the hypnotist's
tone of voice, the phrasing of questions, and the environment of the hypnotic session influence the subject's
answers).
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Thus, some express concern that conducting a hypnotic session free of suggestion
may be impossible.16
This poses problems because the witness cannot differentiate between the wit-
ness's own memories and those memories suggested after the hypnotic session. 17 The
suggestion essentially becomes part of the witness's memory. Therefore, when courts
admit post-hypnotic testimony, they run the risk that a witness might be recalling
memories suggested to them by the hypnotist rather than testifying about actual
recollections. 8
2. Confabulation
Hypnosis suspends the subject's critical judgement, which hinders the subject's
ability to differentiate between events that actually occurred and fantasy or mere
guesses.' 9 Confabulation occurs when the subject unknowingly makes up memories
to fill in the memory gap.° Although several factors contribute to this phenomenon,2'
the danger lies in the post-hypnotic witness's inability to distinguish reality from
confabulation. 22 Thus, confabulation creates a further risk of potential inaccuracies
inherent in post-hypnotic testimony.
3. Memory Hardening
Memory hardening, or overconfidence, amplifies the problems created by hyper
suggestibility and confabulation, and further creates problems of its own. Hypnosis
may greatly increase an individual's confidence in their post-hypnotic testimony,
causing an otherwise hesitant witness to appear completely confident in his or her
memory after undergoing hypnosis. 24 Thus, a witness may present a different
appearance as a result of undergoing hypnosis.'
16. See, e.g., Shaw, supra note I. at 9.
17. Id.
18. See id. at 8-9 (stating that the witness may adopt the suggestions of the hypnotist as actual recollections).
19. Rozzano, supra note 1, at 642.
20. Shaw, supra note 1, at 10; see id. (asserting that the subject of hypnosis may transfer fantasy,
exaggeration, or other memories to compensate for a lack of memory regarding the particular subject); see also
Rozzano. supra note 1, at 642 (characterizing hypnotically recalled memory as a "mosaic" of actual events,
irrelevant actual events, and fantasy).
21. See Shaw, supra note 1, at 10-i1 (citing the subject's wish to please the hypnotist, the subject's desire
to help, and the hypnotist's use of leading questions as the possible causes of confabulation).
22. See Rozzano, supra note 1, at 642.
23. See Shaw, supra note 1, at 12 (stating that hypnosis may increase an individual's belief and confidence
in his or her "memory" so that the witness is able to pass a lie detector test even when the testimony is in fact false).
24. Rozz-no, supra note 1, at 643.
25. See id. (stating that the witness could appear confident in his or her testimony whereas prior to the
hypnosis the witness would have appeared uncertain or tentative).
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Predictably, a jury may lend more credence to a witness's testimony because of
that witness's presentation. 2 In addition, the post-hypnotic witness could testify
confidently regarding events that only exist in his or her memory because of
hypersuggestibility or confabulation. 7
Taken individually or as a whole, these three factors pose significant problems
when considering the admissibility of post-hypnotic testimony in criminal trials.
However, the possible relevance and utility of such testimony militate against
banning the use of post-hypnotic testimony altogether. Therefore, jurisdictions vary
in the way they address the problems that this testimony presents.
C. Different Approaches Regarding Admissibility
In general, jurisdictions have employed one of the following approaches with
respect to the admissibility of post-hypnotic testimony: per se admissibility, admis-
sibility with safeguards, and per se inadmissibility. "Per se admissible" jurisdictions
analogize hypnotically refreshed testimony to testimony refreshed by reading
documents.29 Thus, the use of hypnosis does not affect the admissibility of the testi-
mony. Rather, these jurisdictions view the use of hypnosis as a credibility issue.0
Accordingly, cross-examination is the tool used to address the problems associated
with hypnosis because the jury decides whether the evidence is believable?' The
Federal Rules of Evidence endorse this approach.32
"Admissible with safeguards" jurisdictions assume that safeguards can ensure
the reliability of post-hypnotic testimony.33 This approach seeks to balance the utility
26. Id. at 644; see iU (noting the possible inability of the jury to determine the witness's credibility because
of the witness's "unshakable demeanor").
27. Shaw, supra note 1, at 12; see id. (stating that hypnosis may enable a witness to pass a lie detector test
even though the testimony is false).
28. See Thomas M. Fleming, Admissibility of Hypnotically Refreshed or Enhanced Testimony, 77 A.L.R.
4TH 927 (1995) (discussing the three jurisdictional approaches). But see Rozzano. supra note I, at 664-67
(discussing a fourth standard: the ad hoc balancing approach). The ad hoc balancing approach can fit into the other
three jurisdictional standards.
29. Randy J. Curato et al., Evidence: Hypnotically Enhanced Testimony-A Question of Admissibility or
Credibility for Criminal Courts?, 58 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 101,106 (1982).
30. Shaw, supra note 1, at 15-16.
31. Curato et al., supra note 29, at 106.
32. Rozzano, supra note 1, at 649; see id. at 649 n.50 (listing specific provisions of the Federal Rules of
Evidence dealing with the competency of evidence); see also FED. R. EvID. 402 (declaring all relevant evidence
admissible unless a statute or rule prohibits its admission); id. 403 (excluding unfairly prejudicial evidence); id. 802
(prohibiting the admission of hearsay evidence unless an exception provides otherwise). See generally Fleming,
supra note 28 (discussing the different jurisdictional approaches regarding the admissibility of post-hypnotic
testimony and listing cases from each jurisdiction).
33. Rozzano, supra note 1, at 653; see State v. Hurd, 432 A.2d 86, 96-97 (NJ. 1981) (establishing the
following safeguards: (1) The hypnotic session must be conducted by a psychologist or psychiatrist experienced
in the use of hypnosis, (2) the hypnotist must be independent, (3) a written record of any information must be given
to the hypnotist before the hypnotic session, (4) the hypnotist must receive a detailed written account of the
witness's testimony prior to the hypnotic session, (5) the session must be recorded and (6) the session must be
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of hypnosis with the dangers of its use.3' Thus, once the proponent of the evidence
fulfills the procedural safeguards, the hypnotically enhanced testimony becomes
admissible? 5 Once admitted, the opponent of the testimony may only attack the
reliability of the procedures, not the reliability of hypnosis in general3 6
Finally, "per se inadmissable" jurisdictions view post-hypnotic testimony as
inherently unreliable because of the dangers posed by hypnosis. 37 These jurisdictions
find hypnosis analogous to scientific evidence.3 8 As scientific evidence, these juris-
dictions subject hypnosis to the Frye test-a test which bases the admissibility of
scientific evidence upon the scientific community's acceptance of the evidence as
reliable.39 Whether a witness who has undergone hypnosis may testify to a pre-
hypnotic recollection varies with the jurisdiction. ° California falls into this category.
I. CALIFORNIA LAW
Prior to the adoption of California Evidence Code § 795, the admissibility of
hypnotically enhanced testimony was governed solely by California courts' In
People v. Ebanks42 a California court first confronted the attempted use of hypnosis
in a criminal prosecution. 43 The court summarily dismissed the issue holding that
hypnotism was not recognized in the United States." Consequently, this decision
barred the use of hypnosis in criminal trials by California courts 5
Many years later, California courts changed position. For instance, in People v.
Colligan,4 a police officer hypnotized a victim of an armed robbery, in order to
enable the victim to recall the license plate number of the getaway car.47 While under
hypnosis, the victim gave a description of the armed robber.48 The defendant claimed
limited to only the hypnotist and the subject of hypnosis); id. (requiring the proponent of the evidence to prove that
the requirements are met by a preponderance of the evidence).
34. Curato et aL., supra note 29, at 107.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 108.
37. Rozzzno, supra note I, at 656; see id. at 676-94 (discussing constitutional problems with the use of
hypnotically enhanced testimony by a prosecutor against a criminal defendant).
38. Curato et al., supra note 29, at 108-09.
39. See Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923) (specifying that novel scientific evidence
must be based upon reliable scientific principles and be generally accepted by the relevant scientific community);
see also infra notes 51-53 and accompanying text (reviewing California's version of the Frye test).
40. Rozzano, supra note 1, at 656.
41. See People v. Ebanks, 117 Cal. 652,665-66,49 P. 1049, 1053 (1897) (declaring that the law does not
recognize hypnosis and rejecting its usage without reference to any statute).
42. 117 Cal. 652,49 P. 1049(1897).
43. Ebanks, 117 Cal. at 665-66,49 P. at 1053.
44. Id. at 665-66, 49 P. at 1053.
45. See Cornell v. Superior Court, 52 Cal. 2d 99, 102,338 P.2d 447,448 (1959) (citing Ebanks in support
of the proposition that statements made while under hypnosis are not admissible at trial).
46. 91 Cal. App. 3d 846, 154 Cal. Rptr. 389 (1979).
47. Colligan, 91 Cal. App. 3d at 849, 154 Cal. Rptr. at 390.
48. Id.
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that the victim's prior hypnosis tainted her identification of him at trial.49 The court
upheld the defendant's conviction finding that the use of hypnosis did not render the
identification per se inadmissible.5 °
In People v. Diggs,51 the court refined the idea that hypnotically enhanced test-
imony was not per se inadimissable, by analogizing the use of hypnotic testimony to
the use of a new scientific technique.5 2 The court specified the following three
requirements that the witness must establish to ensure the reliability of the testimony:
(1) The reliability of the method, (2) the expert status of the witness testifying to the
reliability of the method, and (3) that the appropriate scientific procedure was used.53
Finding that the evidence met these three requirements, the court upheld the use of
hypnosis to enhance the victim's memory because the prosecution demonstrated that
the testimony was sufficiently reliable.M Two years later, the California Supreme
Court decided People v. Shirley.55 In this case, a deputy district attorney hypnotized
the victim in order to enhance her memory.56 The court declined to adopt the "admis-
sibility with safeguards" rule applied in other jurisdictions. 7 Instead, the court
reaffirmed the Kelly teset that the court adopted in Diggs.59 However, unlike Diggs,
the court found that the relevant scientific community did not find hypnotically
enhanced or refreshed testimony acceptable or reliable.61 Thus, the court found the
testimony inadmissable because hypnosis was not acceptable to the appropriate
scientific community.6'
In 1984, California adopted Evidence Code § 795.62 Section 795 limits testimony
to events recalled prior to hypnosis and requires the preservation of pre-hypnotic
49. Id. at 850, 154 Cal. Rptr. at 391.
50. Id.
51. 112 Cal. App. 3d 522, 169 Cal. Rptr. 386 (1980).
52. Diggs, 112 Cal. App. 3d at 531.169 Cal. Rptr. at 391.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. 31 Cal. 3d 18, 723 P.2d 1354, 181 Cal. Rptr. 243 (1982).
56. Shirley, 31 Cal. 3d at 29,723 P.2d at 1359, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 248.
57. Id. at 36-39, 723 P.2d at 1364-65, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 253-55; see id. (discussing the approach adopted
in other jurisdictions that allow hypnotically refreshed testimony provided that specified procedural safeguards are
met, and rejecting that approach).
58. See People v. Kelly, 17 Cal. 3d 24,30,549 P.2d 1240, 1244, 130 Cal. Rptr. 144, 148 (1976) (specifying
three elements of the test which must be satisfied: (1) The witness must establish the reliability of the method by
showing the general acceptance of the scientific community, (2) the proponent must qualify the witness as an
expert, and (3) the proponent must establish that the correct scientific procedures were used).
59. See supra notes 51-53 and accompanying text.
60. Shirley, 31 Cal. 3d at 54,723 P.2d at 1375-76, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 265; see id at 54 n.32, 723 P.2d at 1375
n.32, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 264 n.32 (castigating the Diggs court for basing its conclusion upon the testimony of one
expert rather than the acceptability of hypnosis in the relevant scientific community).
61. Id. at 66-67,723 P.2d at 1383-84, 181 Cal. Rptr. at272-73.
62. CAL. Evti. CODE § 795 (amended by Chapter 67).
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testimony in written, audiotape, or videotape form. 63 Thus, California law holds post-
hypnotic testimony per se inadmissible. 4
Section 795 further specifies who may conduct the hypnosis, in addition to
specifying various other procedural requirements.65 Prior law required licensed
Marriage, Family, and Child Counselors (MFCCs) to be certified by the Board of
Behavioral Science Examiners. 6
Chapter 67 amends existing law by no longer requiring certification of MFCCs. 
67
Instead, MFCCs need only be experienced in the use of hypnosis to qualify under the
statute.68 The Board of Behavioral Science Examiners no longer certifies MFCCs in
hypnosis because certification was not required of any other disciplines.! Thus,
MFCCs no longer needed certification to use hypnosis in their practice. Yet, § 795
still required certification which was no longer provided and no longer available to
MFCCs.70 Therefore, Chapter 67 ensures that MFCCs can continue to conduct
hypnosis for the limited use of pre-hypnotic testimony in criminal trials.
IV. ANALYSIS OF CALIFORNIA LAW
Hypnosis is often useful for medical and investigatory purposes.7 California law
seeks to accommodate these valid uses of hypnosis, while protecting against the
dangers inherent with post-hypnotic testimony, by only allowing testimony regarding
events recalled prior to hypnosis. 2 If testimony relating to pre-hypnotic memory
were barred, police would likely refrain from using hypnosis to aid in their
investigations, and would possibly discourage the medical use of hypnosis, for fear
63. Id. § 795(a)(1)(2) (amended by Chapter 67).
64. See id § 795(a)(1) (amended by Chapter 67) (limiting the admissibility of testimony of a witness who
has undergone hypnosis to instances when the witness recalled prior to hypnosis).
65. Id.; see id. § 795(a)(3XA)-(D) (amended by Chapter 67) (requiring a record of the witness's pre-hypnotic
recollection and the information provided to the hypnotist, the witness's informed consent, and a video record of
the hypnotic session).
66. 1987 Cal. Stat. ch. 285, sec. I, at 1346-47 (amending CAL EVID. CODE § 795); see id. (limiting the
performance of hypnosis to certified MFCCs, licensed medical doctors, psychologists, or licensed clinical social
workers experienced in the use of hypnosis).
67. Compare CAL. EVID. CODE § 795 (amended by Chapter 67) (requiring only that MFCC be experienced
in the use of hypnosis to conduct hypnosis) with 1987 Cal. Stat. ch. 285, sec. 1, at 1346.47 (amending CAL. EVID.
CODE § 795) (requiring MFCCs to be certified in hypnosis by the Board of Behavioral Science Examiners).
68. CAL. Evm. CODE § 795 (amended by Chapter 67).
69. SENATECOMMTrEE ON CMINALPROCEDURE, COMMrrTEE ANALYSIS OF SB 2296. at 2 (June 4, 1996);
see CAL. Bus. &PROF. CODE § 4980.02 (West Supp. 1996) (ceasing to require certification of MFCCs by the Board
of Behavioral Science Examiners, and instead only requiring competence as established by their education, training,
or experience in the use of hypnosis).
70. SENATE COMMITm ON CRIMNAL PROCEDURE, CoMMniE ANALYSIS OF SB 2296, at 2 (June 4, 1996).
71. Shaw, supra note 1. at 70 (stating that the use of hypnosis is valid for medical and investigatory uses).
72. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 795(aX) (amended by Chapter 67) (limiting the admissibility of the testimony
of a witness who has undergone hypnosis to events recalled prior to the hypnotic session).
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of jeopardizing their investigation. 3 However, under the California Rules of
Evidence, the dangers of hypnosis would not attach to the witness's testimony
because the witness would only testify to memories recalled prior to undergoing
hypnosis.74
Unfortunately, merely limiting the testimony of a witness to events recalled and
related prior to the hypnotic session may not adequately protect a defendant. Even
pre-hypnotic testimony is not without its share of risks.7 5 First, without proper pro-
cedures, determining whether the testimony is pre-hypnotic or post-hypnotic may be
difficult.76 California law adequately deals with this problem by requiring the pre-
servation of pre-hypnotic testimony in a tangible form, the independence of the
hypnotist, a written record of the information given to the hypnotist prior to the
hypnotic session, and the video taping of the hypnotic session." These procedures
enable the courts to determine whether the testimony is pre-hypnotic or post-
hypnotic.78
Second, memory hardening may pose problems even with pre-hypnotic recol-
lections.79 Hypnosis may increase an individual's confidence in his or her
recollections.8s A witness may question a recollection prior to hypnosis, whereas that
same witness may appear totally confident in the accuracy of a recollection after
hypnosis. 1 This unwarranted confidence may mislead the jury and seriously
undermine the defendant's ability to cross-examine the witness
8 2
Section 795 requires that the "substance of the pre-hypnotic memory" be "pre-
served in written, audiotape, or video tape form." 3 Moreover, § 795 requires the
73. See Shaw, supra note 1, at 70 (commenting that police could still use hypnosis for investigatory
purposes without jeopardizing the use of valid information obtained prior to hypnosis).
74. CAL. EVID. CODE § 795(aX1) (amended by Chapter 67).
75. See Shaw, supra note 1, at 73-74 (noting the possibility that a witness's pre-hypnotic testimony may
be inaccurate).
76. Id.at7l.
77. CAL. EVD. CODE § 795(3XA)-(C) (amended by Chapter 67).
78. See Shaw, supra note 1, at 71-73 (specifying procedures to ensure that testimony is in fact pre-hypnotic,
and noting that these procedures, while applying to pre-hypnotic testimony, mimic the Hurd guidelines for post-
hypnotic testimony). Compare State v. Hurd, 432 A.2d 86, 96-97 (NJ. 1981) (specifying procedural safeguards
to ensure the reliability of hypnotically enhanced testimony) with CAL. EvlD. CODE § 795 (amended by Chapter 67)
(containing many of the Hurd protections and applying them to pre-hypnotic testimony).
79. Shaw, supra note 1, at 73.
80. See supra notes 23-25 and accompanying text (discussing the phenomenon of memory hardening).
81. See Rozzano, supra note 1, at 643 (stating that the witness could appear confident while testifying
whereas prior to the hypnosis the witness would have appeared uncertain or tentative).
82. See Shaw, supra note 1, at73 (stating that memory hardening interferes with a defendant's right to cross-
examine a witness).
83. CAL. EVID. CODE § 795(aX2) (amended by Chapter 67); cf People v. Tunstall, 468 N.E.2d 30, 34 (N.Y.
1984) (listing the following factors to determine if a defendant's right to cross-examine a witness has been impaired
by memory hardening of the witness: (1) The degree of the witness's confidence prior to hypnosis, (2) the witness's
belief that hypnosis yields the truth, (3) the degree of witness's hypnosis, (4) the length of the hypnotic session, (5)
the questions asked in the hypnotic session, (6) the extent of additional details supplied by hypnosis, and (7) any
other factors the court deems appropriate based upon the circumstances).
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proponent of the evidence to prove by clear and convincing evidence that neither the
reliability of the witness nor the defendant's ability to cross-examine the witness has
been impaired. Additionally, the statute allows the defendant to attack the
credibility of the witness.8 Thus, in theory, a defendant need only raise the issue of
memory hardening to force the proponent to prove that this phenomenon did not
occur.
However, in practice, California law may be inadequate because it fails to require
a visual assessment of the witness's pre-hypnotic testimony. Videotaping captures
the essence of the witness's pre-hypnotic testimony best because a person conveys
confidence not only with the spoken word but with body language as well.86
Audiotapes and the written word do not account for a witness's physical conduct in
recalling events. Thus, audiotapes deprive the court of an important factor in making
its determination. A wise prosecutor would videotape the pre-hypnotic recollection
since the prosecutor has the burden of showing that hypnosis did not affect the
defendant's ability to cross-examine the witness8 7
However, the statute authorizes written and audio recordation of the pre-hypnotic
recollection. 8 Because the statute does not require a determination based upon visual
assessment, some courts may find the written word enough to satisfy the proponent's
burden. Should the court do so, it would fail to account for the witness's body
language and demeanor, which are important factors in determining whether memory
hardening occurred. Therefore, a court's determination without a visual assessment
of the witness's pre-hypnotic testimony may deny a defendant's right to cross-
examination. 89 Thus, placing a clear and convincing evidence burden on the pro-
secution may not be enough to protect the defendant's rights.
On the other hand, § 795 requires the videotaping of the hypnotic session
including the pre- and post-hypnosis interview.90 If the pre-hypnosis interview
includes the witness's recall of events, the videotape would capture the witness's
physical behavior. However, the statute does not specify whether the hypnotist must
inquire about the witness's recall prior to the hypnotic session.9' Because the
hypnotist must receive a written record of the witness's recollection prior to the
hypnotic session,92 the hypnotist may not inquire about the witness's recollection in
84. CAL. EVID. CODE § 795(a)(3)(D) (amended by Chapter 67).
85. Id. § 795(b) (amended by Chapter 67).
86. See supra notes 23-25 and accompanying text (stating that hypnosis may make an otherwise hesitant
witness appear confident thereby changing that witness's appearance).
87. See CAL. EvID. CODE § 795 (amended by Chapter 67) (requiring the proponent of the evidence to
establish the reliability of the testimony by clear and convincing evidence).
88. Id. § 795(a)(3)(A) (amended by Chapter 67).
89. See Rozzano, supra note I, at 677-83 (discussing a defendant's constitutional right to confront a
witness).
90. CAL. EviD. CODE § 795 (a)(3)(C) (amended by Chapter 67).
91. See id. (failing to specify that a hypnotist must inquire about the witness's recall in the pre-hypnosis
interview).
92. Id. § 795(a)(3)(A) (amended by Chapter 67).
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the pre-hypnosis interview. This scenario leaves open the possibility that no visual
recordation of the witness's pre-hypnotic recollection will be available. Accordingly,
California should specifically require some type of visual recordation of the witness's
pre-hypnotic recall so that the fact-finder can truly assess whether memory hardening
has occurred. As a further safeguard, the statute should include factors to help deter-
mine whether the hypnosis caused memory hardening.9 3
V. CONCLUSION
California law goes a long way in balancing the utility of hypnosis with the
dangers of its usage by not allowing post-hypnotic testimony. Assuming California
law adequately protects a defendant from the problems associated with hypnotically
enhanced testimony, Chapter 67 makes necessary changes to ensure that pre-hypnotic
testimony of a witness hypnotized by an MFCC is still admissible. However, prob-
lems regarding memory hardening and the right of a defendant to cross-examine a
witness may still exist if a witness is allowed to testify about his or her pre-hypnotic
recollections without further protections against memory hardening.
APPENDIX
Code Section Affected
Evidence Code § 795 (amended).
AB 2296 (Gallegos); 1996 STAT. Ch. 67
93. See, e.g., People v. Tunstall, 468 N.E.2d 30, 34 (N.Y. 1984) (listing the following considerations
adopted by the New York Court of Appeals to determine whether a defendant's right to cross-examination has been
prejudiced by memory hardening: (1) The amount of confidence the witness had in his or her pre-hypnotic
recollection, (2) the extent of his or her belief that hypnosis yields the truth, (3) the degree he or she was
hypnotized, (4) the length of the session, (5) the nature and type of questioning employed, (6) the effectiveness of
hypnosis in finding additional details, and (7) any other factors the court deems important).
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Technology and the Best Evidence Rule
Sean Allen
I. INTRODUCTION
Technology is changing the way people communicate and interact. The law must
adapt and grow with these changes or risk becoming obsolete and ineffective. The
best evidence rule maintains it is better for the trier of fact to view the full original'
of a writing2 than a copy purporting to represent that writing which may have been
tampered with or that may present only a portion of the relevant evidence. In 1983,
an exception to the best evidence rule was enacted to allow printed representations
of the information contained on computers.4 California has now added exceptions for
images stored on video tape and digital medium5 in recognition of developing law
enforcement methods and technology.6
II. BACKGROUND
Chapter 345 is sponsored by the Sacramento Police Department.7 They are cur-
rently in the final stages of testing a new method of crime scene investigation using
digital technology and want to ensure any evidence they capture with the new
methods will be admissible in court.8 While prior law was designed to, and would
likely, cover the new technology, the Sacramento Police Department wanted to
ensure no challenges would develop.9
1. See CAL. EvID. CODE § 255 (West 1995) (defining "original" as the writing itself or any counterpart
intended to have the same effect by the person executing or issuing it); see also FED. R. EViD. 1001(3) (providing
the same definition of original as found in California Evidence Code § 255).
2. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 250 (West 1995) (defining "writing" as "handwriting, typewriting, printing,
photostating, photographing, and every other means of recording upon any tangible thing any form of
communication cr representation, including letters, words, pictures, sounds, or symbols or combinations thereof");
see also FED. R. EvrD. 1001(1) (defining "writings" as "letters, words, or numbers, or their equivalent, set down
by handwriting, typewriting, printing, photostating, photographing, magnetic impulse, mechanical or electrical
recording, or other form of data compilation").
3. See CAL EVID. CODE § 1500 (West 1995) (stating that the best evidence rule requires that no evidence
other than the original of a writing is admissible to prove the content of that writing); see also 2 B.E. WrmN,
CALIFORNIA EVIDENCE, Documentary Evidence § 922 (3d ed. 1986) (explaining that there is an opportunity for
fraud or misrepresentation unless the original of a writing is produced).
4. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1500.5(b) (West Supp. 1997).
5. Id. § 1500.6 (enacted by Chapter 345).
6. SENATE RULEs COMMITTEE, COMMITrEE ANALYSIS OF AB 2897, at 2 (July 7, 1996).
7. Id.; see id. (noting that the Sacramento Police Department sponsored Chapter 345 due to the
development of new technologies in law enforcement).
8. Id. at 2-3; see hd (explaining the new method of recording crime scenes utilizing digital technology that
records images to a computer disc instead of standard film).
9. Id. at 3.
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At a time when budgetary considerations are granted the highest priority,
inexpensive and reliable methods made possible by new technologies are extremely
valuable to local, state, and national public entities.10 Therefore, it seems safe to
assume other law enforcement agencies will follow the example of the Sacramento
Police Department in the coming years. Consequently, the threshold issue of the
admissibility of video and digital evidence is arguably of national importance.
mT. ANALYSIS
The best evidence rule was designed to minimize the possibilities of misinter-
pretation and misrepresentation of "writings" by requiring the production of the
original writings themselves." The definitions of what constitute "writings" and
"originals" far exceed the normal everyday meaning of the words.' 2 As technology
and the means of recording information have developed, the definitions have ex-
panded to include more than just the hand or typewritten word.13 "Writing" and
"original" now encompass virtually every form of nonverbal communication to
protect against the introduction of fraudulent evidence. 14 Unfortunately, the rule can
also be a burden upon the court system. In a technology-driven age, it can be much
more efficient to allow the use of representations of an original which are easier to
understand and produce than the original itself. 5
Chapter 345 was enacted to provide an exception to the best evidence rule for
images stored on video and digital mediums identical to that contained in the
California Evidence Code for computer information.' 6 However, while the Advisory
10. See id. at 2-3 (explaining that digital and video technology is cheaper and faster than existing methods
of crime scene recordation).
11. 7 Cal. L. Rev. Comm. Reports 1,277 (1965).
12. See supra notes 1-2 (defining "writing" and "original"); see also Jones v. City of Los Angeles, 20 Cal.
App. 4th 436,440 n.5, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d 528,530 n.5 (1993) (stating that a videotape is a "writing").
13. See supra note 12 (providing authority for the expanded definition of "writing").
14. See supra notes 1-2 (setting forth every major form of nonverbal communication utilized in the United
States); see also WrnrN, supra note 3, § 922 (stating there is an opportunity for fraud unless the original is
produced as evidence).
15. See CA. EvrD. CODE § 1500.5 (West Supp. 1997) (allowing printed representations of the information
stored on a computer instead of requiring submission of the computer itself which would be meaningless to most
triers-of-fact without further time-consuming explanation).
16. See id (providing similar language to that found in California Evidence Code § 1500.6). California
Evidence Code § 1500.5(a)-(c) reads as follows:
[A] printed representation of computer information or a computer program which is being used by or
stored on a computer or computer readable storage media shall be admissible to prove the existence and
content of the computer information or... program.
Computer recorded information ... shall not be rendered inadmissable by the best evidence rule.
Printed representations of computer information and computer programs will be presumed to be accurate
representations .... This presumption, however, will be a presumption affecting the burden of
producing evidence only. If any party to ajudicial proceeding introduces evidence that such a printed
representation is inaccurate or unreliable, the party introducing it into evidence will have the burden of
proving, by a preponderance of evidence, that the printed representation is the best available evidence
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Committee on the Federal Rules of Evidence acknowledged that the need for a best
evidence rule is substantially decreased with the increased latitude in discovery pro-
cedures, it is important to note there are no similar exceptions in the Federal Rules
of Evidence.17 The Federal Rules of Evidence preserve the best evidence rule because
of a few limited circumstances.' 3 In addition, the federal rules were written to take
into account new technologies such that videotapes and mechanical or electronic
recordings fall within the best evidence rule.' Thus, by creating an exception for
those types of evidence, California is at the cutting edge of revisions to the best
evidence rule. These revisions may later be followed by the Federal Rules of
Evidence as they have already acknowledged the primary purpose of the rule has dis-
sipated with enhanced discovery procedures.20
A. Videotapes
Several states and the Federal Rules of Evidence consider videotapes to be
writings for purposes of the best evidence rule.2 ' California, however, created an
exception for videotapes and allows a party to submit images from a tape, instead of
the entire tape.Y Thus, the images stored on videotape are now considered the same
as those stored on motion picture film where every frame is considered a writing in
its own right.23 The addition is logical because the images stored on any type of film
are simply captured light. There is no reason to treat them differently because of the
type of film they are recorded upon.
However, opponents of Chapter 345 were concerned that it would abrogate the
decision in People v. Enskat.2 4 In that case, police officers took pictures of a film
being shown in a theater and attempted to have those pictures introduced as
of the existence and content of the computer information or computer programs that it purports to
represent.
Id § 1500.5(a)-(c) (West Supp. 1997).
17. FED. R. EVID. 1001 advisory committee's notes.
18. Id; see id (setting forth that discovery of documents from outside the courts, jurisdiction, unanticipated
documents, and differing discovery rules in criminal cases are sufficient reasons to maintain the best evidence role).
19. See FED. R. EVID. 1001(1), (2) (providing definitions of "writings" and "photographs" for the best
evidence rule).
20. See id. advisory committee's notes (setting forth the history of the best evidence rule and explaining
that discovery rules have lessened its importance).
21. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.951 (West 1979) (defining "videotape" as a "writing" under the best
evidence rule); GA. CODEANN. § 24-5-26 (1995) (same); MONT. CODE ANN. § 26-10-1001 (1995) (same); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 8C-1001 (1992) (same); FED. R. EvID. 1001(2) (same); DEL. R. EvID. ANN. 1001 (same); MINN. R. EViD.
1001 (same); N.H. R. EViD. 1001 (same); OH. EvIm. R. 1001 (same); R.I. EvtD. R. 1001 (same); TENN. R. EviD. §
1001 (1996); VT. R. EVID. § 1001 (1983).
22. CAL EVM. CODE § 1500.6 (enacted by Chapter 345).
23. See People v. Enskat, 20 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 1, 3,98 Cal. Rptr. 646,647 (1971) (stating each individual
frame of a motion picture is a writing in and of itself).
24. 20 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 1, 98 Cal. Rptr. 646 (1971); SENATE RULES COMMrrrEE, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS
oFAB 2897, at 2 (July 7, 1996).
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evidence The court determined that the film itself, and not the pictures, was the
proper evidence.2 To prevent abuses of this type, the legislation includes provisions
specifically stating Chapter 345 does not abrogate the decision in Enskat.7 Thus,
Chapter 345 enables the direct use of single images stored on videotape, but does not
allow other representations of those images.2
B. Digital Medium
The exception for digital images is the most natural extension of the exception
for computer information contained in California Evidence Code § 1500.5. 29 Digital
imaging relies upon special equipment which records images directly to a computer
disc. 30 Those images are very clear and provide law enforcement agencies much
greater flexibility in their use of the images in addition to eliminating some of the
costs associated with standard photography?'
Opponents of the digital imaging technology are concerned that it will be easy
to manipulate and alter, thus defeating the purpose of the best evidence rule?2 Pro-
ponents argue that the new technology is no easier to alter than standard photographs
and negatives. The ultimate conclusion to this question shall be revealed through
experience sometime in the future, but until then, the proponents' argument may be
presumed correct because their beliefs prevailed in the legislature.34 Regardless, there
are safeguards built into Chapter 345 and existing law which make abuses of the new
medium, or videotape evidence, highly unlikely.
Chapter 345 contains provisions stating the party attempting to introduce the
video or digital images must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the
images are accurate representations of the whole. 35This guarantees that if any dispute
regarding the accuracy of the images does arise, the aggrieved party can be assured
the judge will view the entire recording, or at least its relevant portions. While this
may result in trial delays, juries will not be given tainted evidence unless the court
fails in its duty. If the jury does receive tainted evidence, an appeal is available. In
the long run, Chapter 345 will save valuable docket time by freeing the trier of fact
from being forced to endure full presentations when a more simple showing will
suffice.
25. Enskat, 20 Cal. App. 3d Supp. at 3,98 Cal. Rptr. at 647.
26. Id. at 3-4, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 647-48.
27. CAL. EVM. CODE § 1500.6(b) (enacted by Chapter 345).
28. Id. 150.6(a) (enacted by Chapter 345).
29. See id. § 1500.5 (West 1995) (setting forth the exception to the best evidence rule for computer data).
30. SENATE RuLES COMMmE, COMMrrIEE ANALYSS OF AB 2897, at I (July 7, 1996).
31. Id. at 2-3.
32. Id. at 3.
33. SENATEJUDICIARY COMMfTEF, COMMITEE ANALYSIS OFAB 2897, at 4 (June 25, 1996).
34. See CAL EviD. CODE § 1500.6 (enacted by Chapter 345). The passage of the legislation indicates the
arguments of the proponent carried more weight with the legislature.
35. Id.
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In addition, trial courts have tremendous discretion on what to allow into
evidence.36 The best evidence rule itself is extremely flexible in allowing the courts
to exercise this discretion.37 Courts are to consider the chance of inaccuracy, the
importance of the evidence, and the difficulty of producing a full original before
determining whether to require production of an original. 8 Thus, while in many
cases, the digital or video images could be admitted prior to Chapter 345, even with
it, the images may not be the best evidence.39 In this respect, Chapter 345 will have
very little effect on existing law.
IV. CONCLUSION
Chapter 345 is a logical and natural extension of existing exceptions to the best
evidence rule. The courtroom must maintain pace with the rest of society, and that
means adapting to new and innovative technologies. The videotape exception shows
that the legislature realizes there is little or no difference between the types of film
an image is stored upon. The digital exception is probably already contained in
existing law as well because it utilizes a computer disc. However, as a newer tech-
nology, there may be possible undiscovered potentials for abuse. These unknown
potential abuses will likely amount to nothing. To the extent the medium can be
tampered with, the discretion of the court along with the available procedures to
demand production of the full recording should prevent any abuses. Nonetheless, if
the safeguards prove to be insufficient, the legislature can remove the exception as
easily as it included it.
APPENDIX
Code Section Affected
Evidence Code § 1500.6 (new).
AB 2897 (Bowler); 1996 STAT. Ch. 345
36. See People v. Johnson, 39 Cal. App. 3d 749, 762, 114 Cal. Rptr. 545, 565 (1974) (noting that a trial
court has wide discretion in determining what evidence to admit).
37. People v. Mastin, 115 Cal. App. 3d 978,985, 171 Cal. Rptr. 780,783 (1981).
38. Id.; see id. (discussing the factors a trial court is to consider in utilizing its discretion on the submission
of evidence); id. (listing as factors the importance of the original and the difficulties involved in producing the
original).
39. See Johnson, 39 Cal. App. 3d at 763, 114 Cal. Rptr. at 554 (stating an eyewitness will always be the best
evidence over eny recorded representation).
